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SUMMARY
The security landscape is constantly evolving. Therefore, in order to build better defenses,
it is critical to evaluate emerging and existing threats to better understand how and where to
prioritize future security efforts. Ideally, such evaluation of threats should be based on real
world data, but this introduces a number of challenges. In particular, real world data must be
collected, parsed, and cleaned before any sort of analysis can proceed.
The work in this thesis provides an empirical analysis of numerous existing or emerging
threats using real world data at scale. As such, it provides the first real world study on the
emergence mobile malware by studying network traffic from almost 25M devices—showing
that security practices on popular mobile device platforms appear to be fairly effective. In
addition, it studies the unintended security consequences of hundreds of millions of domain
expirations over several years and shows that malware is increasingly using expired domains
for abuse—as well as providing a lightweight algorithm for detecting such expirations.
Finally, it studies the evolution of 27M malware collected over almost a half decade—
confirming some existing findings at scale and identifying several shortcomings of the




From the rise of mobile malware [91] to botnets resulting from insecure IoT devices [45],
the types of threats seen on the Internet are constantly evolving as technology progresses.
This leaves security researchers and practitioners with a seemingly endless list of threats to
defend against—making it challenging to figure out how to prioritize security efforts. To
help guide the usage of security resources and build better defenses, the security community
should be able to rely on empirical analysis of existing and emerging threats. Ideally, this
analysis should be based on real world data, but beyond simply obtaining such data, this
introduces a number of challenges. Real world data is inherently noisy and, consequently,
requires cleaning before any sort of meaningful analysis can proceed. Thus, studies based
on empirical data must often enhance or refine existing data analysis techniques to derive
useful insights.
Given the diversity of Internet threats, another challenge is identifying where to collect
the data used for analysis of existing and emerging threats. Data collected from host-based
sensors can potentially offer very rich, detailed information about threats; however, host
based sensors must be deployed on all devices in a study. Clearly, this is untenable for
Internet threats that may span a geographically diverse set of networks operated by different
organizations—each with hosts that are running different architectures and operating systems.
Fortunately, the Internet is based on a common suite of network protocols. At the core of
these is the Internet Protocol (IP), which provides the fundamental means of addressing
resources on the network. IP addresses can be difficult to remember and may frequently
change over the lifetime of a network resource. To address this problem, the Domain Name
System (DNS) acts as a phonebook for the Internet, mapping easy to remember domain
1
names to IP addresses. Both applications and users rely on DNS when accessing Internet
resources such as websites and network services. DNS is fundamental to modern IP based
communication networks, and given its importance on the Internet, it provides an excellent
vantage point from which to perform analysis of Internet threats at scale. Not only is it
agnostic of the underlying platform, but data collected from popular recursive DNS servers
can provide insights into traffic from a large number of devices. This thesis presents several
large scale, empirical studies of existing or emerging threats—each of which rely on DNS
for measurements at scale.
The first study discussed in this thesis addresses the emerging threat from mobile
malware. With the rise of smartphones and tablets, malware targeting these platforms has
grown over time. This has drawn the attention of security researchers who have spent
considerable effort trying to characterize mobile malware [80, 81, 91, 252, 253] through a
range of static and dynamic analysis techniques. However, unlike traditional computing
devices, mobile devices tend to rely on first party software markets for distribution of mobile
applications, and each of these markets implements its own security safeguards to try and
prevent malicious applications [59, 138]. Beyond software markets, the security policies of
mobile applications themselves are enforced differently than on mobile devices—enforcing
finer grained permissions of capabilities and using sandboxing for application isolation.
Despite these stringent security safeguards, the growth of malware targeting mobile devices
seems staggering [87]. However, prior to our study, it was not well understood how widely
the mobile ecosystem was actually infected with mobile malware. Thus, a major goal of this
study was to better understand infection rates in the mobile ecosystem and to discover if the
infrastructure used by mobile malware actually differed from that of traditional malware.
The next study empirically analyzed the growing threat caused by expiring domain
names. As previously discussed, DNS is fundamental to IP based networks. Consequently,
domain names are often used as anchors of trust, where simple ownership of a domain is
enough to attest one’s identity. Unfortunately, domain ownership can change and, when
2
this happens, the trust in that domain is implicitly inherited by the future owner—creating
an opportunity for the new owner to abuse that trust. An extremely common form of
domain ownership stems from the expiration and subsequent re-registration of a domain
name. In our study, we show that this is exceeding common by observing hundreds of
millions of domains expiring over a period of seven years. We found instances of expired
domains associated with a number of different uses from open source software repositories,
browser plugins, redundant services, and e-mail addresses used by critical services. The
consequence of an attacker re-registering these domains varied even though the underlying
cause remained the same. DNS based blacklists and reputation systems are also affected by
this phenomenon as malicious actors can leverage the good reputation of an expired domain
when they re-register the domain and repurpose it for abuse. A major goal of this study was
to empirically measure the prevalence of this abuse over an extended period of time and
present some potential remedies based on our findings.
Our final study presents a longitudinal analysis of nearly thirty million malware samples
over a half decade. Many systems have been proposed to statically and dynamically
analyze malicious software and produce detailed behavioral reports [169, 244] over the last
decade, which has resulted in vast amounts of data collected by such systems. As a result,
researchers now have access to more malware related data than ever before, but previous
studies [105, 171, 173, 216, 248, 251] often used small datasets and performed narrowly
focused analysis—studying topics like the role of cloud providers, the infrastructure behind
drive-by downloads, or the domains used by few malware families. Given the wealth of
malware data currently available, a major goal of this study was to shed light on how the
infrastructure and methods used by Internet miscreants have evolved over time. This enables
us to confirm existing results, unearth new behaviors, and identify trends that may require
further investigation.
Ultimately, the goal of this thesis is to shed light onto different threats facing the Internet
through empirical analysis. Through multiple empirical studies of Internet threats, we
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presented three key insights that were previously unknown to the security community. First,
the study of mobile malware empirically demonstrated that very few mobile devices appear
to be infected with mobile malware—challenging the conventional wisdom of the time—
and that mobile threats look similar from the perspective of network infrastructure. Next,
we showed that not only is residual trust abuse the underlying cause of many seemingly
disparate security problems, but it is also a threat that is increasingly being leveraged by
malware—showing consistent growth year over year—in our in our empirical study of
domain expirations. Finally, our longitudinal study of nearly 27M malware samples over
half a decade demonstrated that malware samples are frequently discovered weeks or months
after the threat is visible on the network—suggesting that systems that rely on malware may
result in large windows of vulnerability for organizations that rely on them. Not only do
our studies provide valuable insights into several existing and emerging Internet threats, but
they underscore how DNS provides an excellent platform agnostic data source for studying
such threats.
1.1 Contributions
Empirical Analysis of Mobile Malware: The advent of mobile operating systems like
Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android has resulted in mobile devices that are increasingly
capable and easy to use. Such devices have seen rapid adoption and, as a result, are
increasingly attractive targets for malware authors. To better understand the magnitude of
the threat posed to mobile devices, we perform the first empirical study of mobile malware
using traffic from a major cellular provider in the United States [150]. Not only does this
study allow us to quantify the threat in terms of real subscribers, but it also enables us to
analyze if the network communication from mobile threats differs from traditional malware.
Lastly, we introduce several enhancements for DNS filtering that were necessary to help
distinguish between mobile and non-mobile devices in cellular networks.
Empirical Analysis of Expired Domain Abuse: The domain name system (DNS) is
4
fundamental to IP based networks, and on the Internet, domains are frequently treated
as anchors of trust. Simple ownership of a domain is often enough to gain the trust of
users as well as network applications and services. We introduce the notion of residual
trust in the context of expiring domains, discuss how abuse of residual trust is the root
cause of a number of seemingly different security problems, and empirically measure the
extent to which residual trust is being abused by malware [152]. Additionally, we develop
a lightweight algorithm for locating potential domain ownership changes using only DNS
data—providing a possible technical remedy for addressing residual trust abuse.
Empirical Analysis of Traditional Malware: Malware is at the center of many security
incidents on the Internet, and understanding how malware evolves and communicates is
critical when attempting to build defenses against it. Therefore, we performed a longi-
tudinal study over a half decade, which looks at nearly thirty million malware samples,
to understand the evolution of different types of malware and features of their network
communication [151]. We observed that potentially unwanted programs (PUP) have be-
come more prevalent than traditional malware in recent years, and PUPs exhibit different
network behavior than traditional malware. Furthermore, we provide several insights into
how malware commonly uses domain names and the infrastructure those domains resolve
to. To facilitate this analysis, we enhance several existing techniques in order to filter and
cluster the data used in our analysis.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
We start by providing the background necessary to understand the content presented in this
thesis, followed by a discussion of related work, in Section 2.1.
Next, we present our empirical study of mobile malware using network traffic, from
a cellular carrier in the United States, in Chapter 3. The methodology used to perform
this study, including enhanced techniques, is discussed in Section 3.2. A discussion of the
datasets used in this study follows in Section 3.3, and finally, we conclude this chapter with
5
a discussion of the results in Section 3.4.
We continue with another empirical study of expired domain abuse in Chapter 4. Before
presenting the empirical results of our study, we discuss several case studies of residual trust
abuse in Section 4.2. Then we proceed with our empirical analysis of residual trust abuse in
Section 4.3 followed by presentation of a new technique for detecting possible instances of
residual trust abuse in Section 4.4. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of potential
remedies for this emerging threat in Section 4.5.
In Chapter 5, we present the results from our longitudinal study of nearly thirty million
malware samples over a half decade. We begin with an introduction to the datasets used to
perform our study in Section 5.2. This is followed by a discussion of how we performed
the filtering and classification of these datasets in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. We
conclude this chapter with a presentation of our findings in Sections 5.5 through 5.8.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis, starting with a summary of contributions. We then
proceed with a discussion of the limitations of our work in Section 7.1. Finally, we leave the





2.1.1 The Domain Name System
The domain name system (DNS) is a backbone protocol for the Internet that maps easy-
to-remember domain names to IP network addresses. The domain name space is arranged
as a tree, beginning with a root node. In the DNS hierarchy, under the root node are
the top-level domains (TLDs), and under the TLDs are the second-level domains, and so
on. Common TLDs include com., net., and uk.. A fully qualified domain name (FQDN)
includes all domain levels that describe the node in the DNS tree; for example, the FQDN
www.example.com. contains the TLD (com.), the 2LD (example.), and the 3LD (www.). A
large portion of the domains are registered directly under a TLD. In some cases, however,
this is not possible; therefore, domains under which users can directly register a new domain
name are often considered effective TLDs. The canonical example is that many domains in
the UK are registered under co.uk. and not under uk. directly.
The basic type of information link in DNS is the resource record (RR). DNS defines a
number of RR types. For example, an A-type RR links a domain name with an IPv4 network
address, while a CNAME-type RR links a domain name with another “canonical” domain
name [164, 165].
RRs are returned in response to a DNS query from a requester. Figure 1 illustrates the
DNS query process from a host for the A-type record for example.com.. A DNS query is
initiated by a DNS resolver running on a host. This application is responsible for generating
some sequence of queries and translating the responses to arrive at the requested resource.

















Passive DNS Data Collection
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Figure 1: Example of the domain resolution process.
In a typical use, an end system will issue a recursive request using a stub resolver to a
dedicated recursive DNS resolver (RDNS) (Step 1, Figure 1). In a recursive request, the
RDNS is charged with completing the iterative portion of the DNS resolution process. It
will communicate with the necessary remote name servers (NS) and returns a DNS answer,
from the authoritative NS for the requested domain, to the stub resolver in the form of an
RR-set. In the case of Figure 1, the RDNS sends iterative requests to the various levels of
the DNS hierarchy (Steps 2–7). In Step 7, the RDNS receives the authoritative answer for
example.com., and sends it to the requester (or stub resolver) in Step 8, completing the DNS
resolution. The RDNS will typically cache the RR locally for up to some period, the Time
To Live (TTL), specified in the RR. This improves efficiency and reduces the load on the
DNS infrastructure.
2.1.2 Passive DNS Monitoring
Since a RDNS mediates all requests from a client’s stub resolver, it is possible to perform
passive DNS (pDNS) data collection of DNS queries received at the RDNS. This pDNS data
collection typically includes all of the information associated with the successfully resolved
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Figure 2: Timeline of a domain expiration.
DNS queries by the RDNS.
There are several benefits to using pDNS monitoring for DNS analysis. Malicious
queries are able to be logged and analyzed without alerting the owners of the malicious
domains (unlike DNS probing [118, 157]). Another benefit of pDNS data collection is that
it can allow the discovery of malicious domains not previously known to exist on DNS
blacklists (DNSBL) [43, 44, 61] and does not require previous knowledge of the domain’s
existence. A potential drawback of pDNS data collection at the local RDNS level is that the
data collected will be limited by the amount of traffic handled by the RDNS. Therefore, it is
important to collect a large number of queries from a geographically diverse set of RDNS
servers.
2.1.3 Domain Registration Process
We define the term residual trust as the historical reputation of a domain that is implicitly
transferred with changes in ownership. In this section, we detail the process governing a
domain’s expiration. In the following sections, we explain how these expired domains can
be exploited by abusing the domain’s residual trust.
Domain names are registered, owned, and expired using processes created by Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in conjunction with registry
operators and registrars. With a few exceptions, domains are typically registered for a period
of one or more years, after which the registrant (i.e., owner) has the option to renew.
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As a domain registration approaches its expiration date, it begins the formal ICANN ex-
piration process. For generic top-level domains (such as .com, .net, and .info) the expiration
process is governed by ICANN’s Expired Registration Recovery Policy (ERRP) [125]. We
summarize this process in Figure 2 and discuss the details below.
ICANN’s expiration process is intended to address several past and potential abuses such
as “domain sniping”, whereby a vigilant “domainer” would register the domain seconds
after expiration and extort a price to transfer the domain back to the former owner. Under
the current process, domainers hoping to speculate on expired and lapsed domains must now
wait until the release event, giving the current registrant time to renew the registration even
after the domain expires.
Specifically, the ERRP requires registrars attempt to notify the lapsed owners (twice
prior to expiration, once after). However, in practice, many owners cannot be reached
due to a variety of reasons including inaccurate registration information, general neglect,
or “tucked” domains. The latter reason, tucked domains, refers to situations where the
contact information for the domain resides entirely under the expiring DNS zone itself. For
instance, the registrar contact information, WHOIS information, and start of authority SOA
RNAME [164] may be entirely under the expiring zone.
After the domain expires, the registrar will delete the domain from the TLD zone causing
it to enter a 30-day Redemption Grace Period (RGP). Typically, deletion occurs within 1–45
days after expiration, but the exact length of time may vary due to extenuating circumstances
or provisions in the myriad registrar and registry agreements. While in the grace period,
the expired domain may still be renewed by the previous registrant, but this is typically at
a higher cost. The domain is released five days following the conclusion of the RGP and
becomes available for re-registration by others.
There are other variations of the domain expiration process. For example, the Canadian
Internet Registration Association uses a “To Be Released” (TBR) process where expiring
domains are listed along with all homonyms. For example, cardreaders.ca is TBR
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listed along with all accented variations such as çardreaders.ca, cárdreaders.ca,
and other permutations. The 30-day process includes a short advance bid auction followed
by general release.
Since many expiring domains are valuable brands, large groups of “drop-catchers” pool
their resources to attempt registration in the first seconds after release. In order to prevent
DDoS-style events against the registries, many providers stagger the release of expiring
domains and publish the specific hour (and often the specific minute) during which a given
domain will become available. Since valuable dropped domains are generally acquired
within seconds, this strategy minimizes the period over which large volumes of registration
attempts are directed against the registry.
Despite the post-expiration deletion phase, during which the domain is typically unreach-
able, third party users will often still attempt to connect to the domain. Increasingly, these
connections are through automated tools, and users are often unaware the domain is even
absent from DNS. For example, operating systems may attempt to update installed packages
through an automated (e.g., cron, launchd) process. Browser plugins may contact home
sites upon application startup. Software sharing tools may create connections to numerous
file sharing sites on startup in order to obtain timely updates and routing tables stored
in distributed hash tables. All of the domains associated with these automated activities
can and do expire. Therefore, the party acquiring the expired domain has thousands and
even millions of users contacting the site. We discuss specific examples and the security
implications of this phenomenon in the next section.
2.2 Previous Work
2.2.1 Malware Infrastructure
A number of works have studied the malicious infrastructure used to distribute malware.
For example, Rossow et al. [198] performed a large scale analysis of malware downloaders
and their network infrastructure. Using the analysis traces of samples belonging to 23
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downloader families, the authors discovered that 20% of the C&C servers remain operable
long-term. In particular, the authors identified 2,942 C&C domains, which resolved to
861 IP addresses hosted in a variety of different ASs. Moreover, they found that malware
infrastructures regularly migrate among different domains, while keeping a redundant
presence in several different providers. In our experiments we are not able to distinguish
C&C from other forms of malware traffic. However, in Section VI we discuss several
characteristics of the hosting infrastructure of the domains resolved by the samples in our
dataset and we found that some families use the same set of IP addresses for very long
periods of time. In particular, PUP seem to have extremely stable infrastructures.
Wang et al. [234] built honeyclients to find drive-by download websites that exploit
browser vulnerabilities. Similarly, Moshchuk et al. [168] used honeyclients to crawl over
18 million URLs, finding that 5.9% contained drive-by downloads. Provos et al. [188]
studied the prevalence of drive-by downloads and the redirection chains leading to them,
finding that 67% of the malware distribution servers were hosted in China [187]. These
papers shed light on other aspects of the malware infrastructure, for instance by pointing
out that malicious files are often hosted on multiple servers reachable by many different
URLs at the same time. While malware samples can also occasionally contact infected
web pages (e.g., to download additional components) our study focuses on the domains
contacted by malware after a system has been infected and not on their drive-by download
infrastructure. In a study closer to our work, Polychronakis et al. looked at the network
behavior of malware distributed by drive-by downloads [183] using light-weight protocol
responders. However, the authors focused on the purpose of the network activity (e.g.,
reporting home, data exfiltration, or joining a botnet) more than on the infrastructure and
domains used by the malware authors. Active probing techniques have been proposed to
measure the size of the server infrastructure for specific malware families [175, 246].
Another relevant line of work studies rogue networks and autonomous systems hosting
unusually large amounts of malicious activity. To this end, Fire [211] used approximately
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one year of data from the Anubis system and Shue et al. [206] a dataset collected over a
period of one month.
More recently, researchers investigated the use of cloud hosting providers as infras-
tructure for malware. These studies were conducted either by performing some form of
active probing [174, 233] or by mining the information extracted from dynamic analysis
sandboxes [111]. In this last case, the authors analyzed over 1M malware samples which
connected to at least one publicly routable address on the Amazon EC2 Cloud. While this
work did study network infrastructure, the results were limited to the Amazon cloud and
required a considerable amount of manual analysis to separate and classify the different
types of communication. By using our larger datasets we were able to confirm this trend
and observe a similar effect on a more global scale, affecting multiple cloud providers - in
particular from 2014. We also found that PUP families are the ones that rely the most on
this type of stable infrastructure.
2.2.2 PUP Infrastructure
Recent work has studied the prevalence of PUP [142, 220], its distribution through pay-
per-install (PPI) services [141, 222], and its detection [144, 145]. Thomas et al. [220]
showed that ad-injectors affect 5% of unique daily IP addresses accessing Google. They
also measured that Google’s Safe Browsing generates three times as many detections
for PUP as for malware [222]. Kotzias et al. measured that 54% of 3.9 M hosts they
examined had PUP installed [141] and that PUP dominates so-called malware feeds [142].
Kwon et al. detect PUP and malware distribution using graph-based approaches leveraging
machine learning [144] and temporal properties [145]. While some of these works explore
PUP-related domains, none of them analyze properties of the PUP domain and server
infrastructure. Most related are the categorization of the top 15,000 pages driving traffic to
PPI downloaders by Thomas et al. [222] and the analysis by Kotzias et al. [141] of the top
20 e2LDs from where PUP is downloaded. Compared to our work, those analyses cover
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different time periods, only a fraction of PUP domains, and more importantly do not explore
infrastructure properties such as PUP domain lifetime and hosting. In summary, we believe
we are first to analyze the properties of the PUP domain and server infrastructure.
2.2.3 Longitudinal Malware Studies
While our study focuses exclusively on the network infrastructure, other researchers investi-
gated the behavior extracted from dynamic analysis sandboxes to study other characteristics
of malware samples.
One of the first attempts in this direction was performed by Bayer et al. [58] using almost
1M samples collected until 2009 by the Anubis platform. Interestingly, in this early study
the authors reported that only 47.3% of the samples that showed some network activity
also performed a DNS query—which succeeded in over 90% of the cases. Lindorfer et
al. [154] performed a similar experiment focusing on the Android malware landscape. In
this case, the authors reported that 99.91% of Android malware performed DNS queries,
with roughly one third failing to resolve—suggesting an increasing adoption of domain
generation algorithms (DGAs). While these studies provided interesting data points, they
were performed at a distance of five years on datasets over 25 times smaller than the one
used in this paper.
Several other papers have analyzed the use of DGAs, which can be used by botnets to
bypass domain blacklists. Kolbitsch et al. [140] used binary code reuse [64] techniques to
extract the DGA of the Conficker.A botnet and use it to compute the set of domains used on
a given date. A related reverse-engineering approach was used by Plohmann et al. [182] to
perform a large-scale analysis of DGAs used in malware. A different approach to detect
and analyze DGAs is Pleiades [50], which monitors unsuccessful DNS resolution requests
from recursive DNS servers in large networks. Our experiments confirm the wide use of
DGA, and find that up to two thirds (67%) of the fully qualified domain names queried by
malware failed to resolve to a valid address.
14
2.2.4 Internet Reputation
Network level analysis of malicious behavior offers a complementary means of characteriz-
ing and mitigating malware. For example, a popular method of preventing or limiting the
spread of malware is the use of Internet blacklists. IP blacklists provide a list of known
bad actors in the form of IP addresses which network operators can subsequently block;
however, the use of DNS to build malicious network infrastructure has grown due to its
resilience against IP blacklisting [199, 205].
Consequently, a significant amount of work has focused on analyzing network abuse at
the DNS level [74, 112, 114, 136, 155, 237]. This has led to the creation of systems that are
able to detect malicious domains through the use of passive DNS monitoring and machine
learning [43, 44, 62]. Ultimately, these systems allow network operators to assemble DNS
blacklists of malicious and suspicious domains in order to detect and prevent malicious
activity on the network.
This has led researchers to study the usefulness of such blacklists. Metcalf et al [160]
performed a comparison of 86 different internet blacklists—of both varying category and
type—over a span of 30 months. Unfortunately, the inventory of blacklists appears to
be partially anonymized, and some blacklists were collected for as little as three months.
Therefore, it is difficult to compare these results directly with the blacklists used in this work.
The major findings from their work showed that there is little overlap between lists for fully
qualified domain names or IP addresses and, when there is overlap, no lists consistently
outperforms another. Kührer et al. evaluated the effectiveness of 19 malware blacklists [143]
collected over 2 years by classifying the entries (i.e.,non-existent, parked, or sinkholed),
measuring the completeness, and testing the reaction time of each blacklist. When compared
against a dataset of 300K samples, they show that the union of all blacklists contains 70% of
domains detected per family. Furthermore, 58% of domains were seen in their passive DNS
an average of 334 days before appearing on a blacklist. Our study shows similar results over
a much longer observation period and with almost 100 times more malware.
15
Finally, Rajab et al. proposed a content-agnostic malware protection system based
on binary and IP/DNS reputation to address the shortcomings of both blacklists and
whitelists [191], and other works have been proposed that leverage network related reputation
data for malware detection [134, 189].
2.2.5 Expired Domains
There has been a wealth of research focused on using DNS as a tool for detecting malicious
behavior. For example, researchers have previously used elements of DNS to classify
malicious websites [66, 158]. Other researchers have used DNS information to understand
and predict future malicious behavior [89, 115, 194, 200] and identify previously unknown
malicious domains [48, 49, 51, 185, 190, 247]. In addition to using DNS for prediction and
detection of malicious infrastructure, other work has focused on protecting the domain name
system itself from abuse [54, 76]. Even commercial entities frequently use DNS-based tools
to help protect against known malicious domains through the use of blacklists [208].
Our understanding of expired domain abuse first came from early research into the fate
of failed banking domains by Moore and Clayton [167]. Their study focused on expired
financial sites and found some instances where old, failed bank web sites were re-registered
and likely used for nefarious purposes. However, the study authors were narrowly focused
on methods for detecting failed banking domains.
Unlike this previous work, we study how residual trust—implicitly transferred between
owners of a domain name—affects the security of systems and entities that rely on DNS. Our
multi-year study demonstrates that residual trust abuse is being actively exploited and the
problem is growing. Further, our work shows that this phenomenon impacts prior work by
the security community and, thereby, demonstrates the need for more research into residual
trust and malicious re-registrations.
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2.2.6 Mobile Malware
The importance of mobile networks is increasing as society becomes more reliant on mobile
devices such as smartphones, tablets, and mobile broadband cards. Several works have
examined mobile device network traffic to learn about the general network characteristics of
those devices [85, 88, 101]. Past studies have shown that certain design considerations have
made these networks inherently vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Traynor et
al. [226, 227] proposed a text messaging DoS with only the bandwidth of a cable modem.
This research demonstrated a growing class of vulnerabilities due to the increasingly inter-
twined connectivity between the Internet and traditional voice networks. Other work has
shown that the use of data communication protocols on voice networks creates the potential
for failure under modest loads [197, 228–230]. Accordingly, significant effort has now been
directed towards the analysis of potentially malicious mobile applications.
Numerous studies have highlighted the weaknesses and potential for misuse of various
aspects of the Android security model [70, 83, 90, 92, 93]. Other work on Android devices
suggests that it is difficult to tell if an application breaks any phone-wide security poli-
cies [82] and has resulted in tools to aid in the analysis of Android applications [80, 81].
Additional studies have surveyed the types of malware seen in the wild and evaluated the
efficacy of different techniques in preventing and identifying such threats in the future [91].
However, app analysis alone provides an incomplete picture of the current state of malware
on mobile devices and networks.
Network level analysis of malicious behavior offers a complementary means of charac-
terizing and mitigating malware. For example, a popular method of preventing or limiting
the spread of malware is the use of Internet blacklists. IP blacklists provide a list of known
bad actors in the form of IP addresses which network operators can subsequently block;
however, the use of DNS to build malicious network infrastructures has grown due to its
resilience against IP blacklisting [199, 205]. Consequently, a significant amount of work
has focused on analyzing those networks at the DNS level [74, 112, 136, 155, 237]. This has
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led to the creation of systems that are able to detect malicious domains through the use of
passive DNS monitoring and machine learning [43,61]. Furthermore, recent work has shown
that detection of malicious domains can also be accomplished by passively monitoring DNS
at the upper levels of the DNS hierarchy; this allows DNS operators to independently detect
malicious domains without relying on local recursive DNS servers [44]. Ultimately, these
systems allow network operators to assemble DNS blacklists of malicious and suspicious
domains in order to detect and prevent malicious activity on the network.
Though there has been considerable effort targeted towards detecting network malware,
it has been focused primarily on traditional wired networks. The question of whether such




EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MOBILE MALWARE
3.1 Motivation
Malware writers have begun to pay attention to mobile phones. In response, a significant
amount of effort has been spent by researchers to characterize malware in mobile applications
markets [80, 81, 91, 252, 253]. These efforts have applied a range of static and dynamic
analysis techniques on a large number of applications in an attempt to discover malicious
code. Market operators including Google and Apple have also invested significant resources
in an attempt to prevent malicious applications from being installed on mobile devices
and for later removing such applications if necessary. However, for all of these efforts,
the extent to which the mobile ecosystem is actually infected by such malware is not well
understood. Without such an analysis, it is impossible to determine whether or not current
defense mechanisms are having any demonstrable effect.
In this chapter, we discuss the results of the first network level analysis of mobile
malware using traffic from a major cellular network. We work from the hypothesis that
malicious mobile applications are not different from the bots and malware in the non-cellular
world in that they rely on the same core functionality of the Internet in order to achieve scale
and robustness. In particular, we began our research with the belief that malicious behavior
in the mobile environment similarly relies on the same Internet hosting infrastructure used
to support traditional malware activities including propagation and update (e,g., a malware
download site), command and control (e.g., communication with infected devices), and
data transfer (e.g., a site to upload of stolen data). Should this hypothesis prove to be true,
more traditional network-based techniques for detecting and combatting malware [43] can
potentially be applied in this new space. As research on botnets and malware have shown,
19
such an Internet-based approach is more effective and scalable than malware-analysis based
approaches, particularly in the face of (future) mobile malware with stealth, obfuscated
logic, such as triggered-based behaviors.
3.1.1 Contributions
We verify our hypothesis experimentally using three weeks of DNS data from a major
US-based cellular provider collected over the course of three months. We first show that the
vast majority of the hosts resolved in the cellular dataset are also seen in a separate DNS
dataset from a non-cellular ISP. After this confirmation, we dig more deeply into the cellular
dataset and uncover a number of important results regarding malicious behavior in cellular
networks, including the following contributions:
First, we observe that known mobile malware samples are virtually unseen. We extract
DNS domains from large public and private datasets of mobile malware and specifically
search for their resolution in our dataset. Our analysis demonstrates that only a vanishingly
small number of mobile devices appear to be infected: 3,492 out of 380,537,128 devices,
or less than 0.0009% of the population. This lends credence to the argument that while
the mechanisms market operators implement to protect users from malware may be by-
passable [59, 138], malware writers are failing to infect mobile devices with much success.
Like any application developer, a malware writer faces the challenging task of developing a
popular application (or a malicious application in disguise) that will be downloaded by a
large population. That is, the probability that a user will download an unknown malicious
application is very small. In addition, a legitimate application market will remove any
known malicious application, further reducing the probability of a mobile malware being
downloaded.
Next, we compare traffic to suspicious hosts from iOS against all other devices. Common
opinion argues that the closed nature of Apple’s App Store and operating system make
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devices in this ecosystem more secure. However, our analysis demonstrates that approxi-
mately 8% of iOS-based devices communicate with known suspicious hosts, virtually the
identical frequency as all other mobile platforms. Accordingly, users of these devices do
not appear to be any more or less likely to communicate with potentially malicious hosting
infrastructure than other users. To say the least, iOS does not appear to provide any more
effective mechanisms to prevent users from engaging in unsafe activities.
Lastly, we observe campaigns with mobile malware clients by obtaining traffic from the
upper layer of the DNS hierarchy and analyzing two major threats with mobile malware
clients. We see that the lifetime of these two threats lasts on the order of months, and that
the criminal operators make use of network agility and move their hosting infrastructure
over time (e.g., changing domain names and IPs). Finally, we also note that one of these
campaigns cease operating long before the mobile malware associated with each campaign
is ever identified, lending credence to the possibility that network-based countermeasures
may help identify and mitigate (e.g., via DNS blacklisting) such threats faster than the
analysis of mobile malware.
3.2 Methodology
In this paper, we analyze DNS data generated by devices subscribed to a major US cellular
carrier. For simplicity, we use the term “mobile devices” to describe smartphone and
tablet platforms (e.g. Android, iOS, and others). Our primary focus is Internet-based hosts
contacted by mobile devices using DNS. By host we mean a remote IP address included
in a successful A-type DNS domain name resolution. We focus on the hosts as opposed
to domain names explicitly because of the extensive forensic evidence already connected
with malicious behavior in the Internet (e.g., C&C, drive-by, PPI, etc.). We link the hosts
observed in DNS resolutions within a cellular network with historic evidence of Internet
abuse and reveal the extent to which mobile devices contact hosts historically associated
















Figure 3: A high-level view of the two tasks required to identify malicious behavior by
mobile devices. First, all traffic generated by non-mobile devices is filtered out of our dataset.
Second, the remaining traffic is characterized as either benign, malicious or of unknown
reputation.
Our monitoring point is a single sensor that aggregates traffic collected from several
RDNSs providing DNS resolution services for mobile devices located across many different
US states. We perform two high-level tasks in order to characterize malicious behavior
generated by mobile devices. First, we remove traffic generated by non-mobile devices
(i.e., laptop and desktop machines also serviced by this provider via hotspots and “cellular
connect cards”) and then attribute each request to a specific mobile device; second, we
perform a reputation analysis of the RRs associated with these mobile requests and classify
traffic as having benign, malicious or unknown reputation. This workflow is shown in
Figure 3, and the details of each task are provided in the remainder of this section.
We use the following notation to more formally describe our workflow. A resource record
(RR) refers to either an A-type or CNAME-type record and its corresponding RDATA [164,
165] tuple of (qname, ip) and (qname, domain) respectively. We represent a DNS query, qj ,
for a domain name, d, and the related DNS response, rj , as the tupleQj(d) = (Tj, Rj, IPsj),
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where Tj identifies the epoch in which the query-response was observed, Rj is the unique
identification of the device that initiated the query qj , d is the queried domain, and IPsj is
the set of resolved hosts as reported in the response rj .
3.2.1 Mobile Device Identification Process
Accurately identifying individual devices is challenging due to IP address churn and device
roaming in a cellular carrier. In order to ensure that we do not include non-mobile devices
in our evaluation, we must first be able to attribute traffic to specific devices. We received
proprietary data from the carrier that allows us to definitively attribute traffic to a mobile
device operating on the network for each epoch; however, we cannot correlate devices across
epochs.
We formally define the set of mobile devices in an epoch. Let MDEVi = {Rk}k=1...l
be a set that contains all l mobile device identifiers (Rk) for epoch i, and i ∈ EPOCHS 1.
We then define the set of domains resolved by MDEVi in epoch i as mDNi = {dk}k=1...n,
where n is the number of domains (dk).
Mobile devices are restricted to certain ranges of device IDs that are only associated
with operation over a cellular data connection (i.e., 3G or 4G). While this excludes most
traditional computing devices, traffic generated by a laptop or desktop using cellular connect
cards or tethering through a mobile phone remains in our dataset. We remove this traffic by
examining the resource records associated with each device and looking for mobile-specific
domains. While there is no official standard, there are some common indicators for mobile-
specific domains. One is the use of mobile-specific subdomains such as m.example.com or
mobile.example.com. Another method is the use of the URI path as a mobile indicator, but
since we are working with DNS data, we do not have access to this type of indicator. Table 1
provides a subset of mobile indicators.
In addition to mobile indicators, some domains are strongly or exclusively associated
1We define the set of epochs as single days falling within the following ranges EPOCHS = {4/15/12−
4/21/12, 5/13/12− 5/19/12, 6/17/12− 6/23/12}
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with mobile applications. Such sites include mobile ad networks, mobile application pro-
gramming interfaces, and mobile services. For example, Google’s AdMob [30] advertising
network is only supported on Android and iOS, so devices that contact the AdMob net-
work are almost certainly mobile. Certain mobile APIs use unique domains that are easily
identifiable. Apple’s Push Notifications, for instance, use a set of mobile domains (e.g.,
*.courier.push.apple.com) reserved specifically for the push notifications service.
Additionally, services like HeyTell [2] provide push-to-talk functionality for mobile devices
via a mobile application. Devices communicating with these types of services should be
almost exclusively mobile.
We first exclude all devices Rk that query any of six domain names d in an epoch
j related to standard operations of Windows operating systems 2. Devices are labeled
as mobile only if they contact a domain d with a mobile indicator or domains strongly
associated with mobile applications or services. We are able to identify 132, 516 unique
domain names that fit this former category.
Through the combination of filtering based on device IDs and mobile domain inference,
we are able to identify devices as either mobile or non-mobile with high confidence. In the
small number of cases where overlap exists, we tag a device as unknown and do not consider
its behavior as reflective of mobile devices. By conservatively choosing devices in this
manner, we strongly reduce the likelihood of selecting traditional computing devices that
are connected via mobile broadband cards or tethering. However, if a traditional computing
device is visiting a mobile resource, we would falsely label that device as mobile. We note
that this scenario is exceedingly rare as browsers generally direct users to the appropriate
version of a website.
2Two of the most frequently hit domain names in this list are the time.windows.com and
download.windowsupdate.com.
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Table 1: Examples of popular mobile indicators.







3.2.2 Filtering Benign Domains
At this point in our workflow, we can label a device and associate it with RRs. We can then
begin the second task in Figure 3: classifying each of the resource records requested by
mobile devices. The first step in this process is identifying and removing known benign traffic
from our dataset. Our methodology again remains conservative, aggressively reducing false
positives potentially at the cost of increasing false negatives. We achieve this by whitelisting
all requests made to the top 750,000 effective second level domains (e2LDs) according
to Alexa [40]. However, we must note that we do not whitelist domains associated with
dynamic DNS (DDNS) providers given their common use by network malware. Intuitively,
such broad whitelisting removes the most popular sites (and e2LDs) as they are more likely
to be trustworthy and less likely to be intentionally malicious. This approach is commonly
used in DNS-based reputation and classification systems [43, 44].
We want to remain as conservative as possible and reduce any potential false positives
from our datatset. To that end, we further filter benign traffic from our dataset by removing
a number of the most popular remaining e2LDs. We compile a list of approximately 800
e2LDs based on the lookup volume of the queried domains. We manually inspect all of
them and we classify them as benign. We should note that the lookup volume distribution
for the e2LDS follows a power law.
The end result of the whitelist filtering process is a reduced set of domain names
mDrdcj = {dk}k=1...n, where mDrdcj is a set that contains all n not whitelisted domain
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Algorithm 1: The algorithm used to obtain the set of IP addresses (or hosts) that
represent the hosting infrastructure that facilitated resolution of domain names
from mobile devices in epoch j.
INPUT : MDEVj , mDrdcj and all Qj(di) for every mobile domain name
(di ∈ mDrdcj) observed in epoch j.
Let HOSTSj = ∅, be the set that will contain the unique hosts (or IP addresses)
that have been mapped with the domain names in mDrdcj after the completion of
the process.
[1] : ∀d ∈ mDrdcj:
[2] : Let IPsj be the set of IPs in the tuple Qj(d), if Rj ∈MDEVj




names (dk) resolved by mobile devices in epoch j. In this set we will have domain names in
the “Malicious” and “Unknown” categories of Figure 3.
3.2.3 Feature Extraction
The remaining entries in our dataset now belong to mobile devices communicating with
Internet-based hosts with either malicious or unknown reputations. We now describe the
features that we extract from these remaining domains, which will allow us to analyze the
hosting infrastructure supporting these domains. We use Algorithm 1 to find all unique
IP addresses (hosts) for all domains in the set mDrdcj for epoch j, resulting in the set
HOSTSj = {IPk}k=1...n. For ease of understanding, the entire feature extraction process
is summarized in Figure 4.
We compare the traffic observed in the cellular carrier (only from the mobile devices)
against a pDNS data collection from a non-cellular ISP. Let fpdns(d) = {ipk}k=1...n be a
mapping function that takes a domain name d as input and returns a set of routable IP
addresses that have been historically linked with d.
The f jcell() function returns passive DNS data from the DNS traffic in the cellular carrier






































Figure 4: Determining the communication patterns for each mobile device (Rj). Each
qname requested by Rj is converted into an IP address via Algorithm 1. This list of IP
addresses (HOSTSj) is then processed for Passive DNS Features (PF) to determine overlap
with traffic from our non-cellular ISP and for Evidence Features (EF) to determine the
presence of communications with known malicious domains.
input and returns a set of related historic domain names (dk) observed in the cellular network
during epoch j from mobile devices in set MDEVj .
The function fmal(ip) = α returns the number α of unique malware samples that IP
address ip has been associated with over the past 19 months. The association could be
direct (i.e., the malware contacts the IP address/host) or indirect (i.e., the malware looks up
a domain name that resolves to that IP address/host) as shown in Figure 4. We similarly
define furl(ip) = β and fpbl(ip) = γ, as the functions that return the number of malicious
URLs (β) and malicious entries (γ) in public blacklists.
For every host (ip) in the set HOSTSj we extract the two groups of features: passive
DNS and evidence features. At the end of the feature extraction process, we obtain statistical
historic passive DNS and malicious evidence-based observations (used in Section 3.4.1) for
the set of hosts in HOSTSj .
Passive DNS Features (PF) We collect two features from this group. They are simply the
number of elements in the sets fpdns(ip) (i.e., related historic non-cellular domains) and
f jcell(ip) (i.e., related historic cellular domains) for an address ip.
Evidence Features (EF) We compute a total of three features from this group. These
features describe direct reputations of the IP addresses in the set HOSTSj (during the
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epoch j). We compute three features for each IP address: (i) fmal(ip), the count of unique
malware associated with ip, (ii) furl(ip), the count of URLs associated with ip, and (iii)
fpbl(ip), the count of public blacklisting incidents associated with ip.
Both PF and EF feature families represent the basic building blocks of DNS reputation
systems [43, 61]. We select them to understand (i) the extent that malicious hosts currently
serve mobile-related DNS resolutions and (ii) the extent that the infrastructure used to
resolve mobile-related domain names is already present in passive DNS data collections
from non-cellular networks. In particular, the PF feature family, which is based on passive
DNS data, will show to what extent the hosts from mobile RRs (directly or indirectly) can be
associated with DNS resolutions from a non-cellular ISP. The EF features, which are based
on historic reputation information, will show us to what extent the already tainted Internet
hosting infrastructure is currently used directly by mobile devices. Additionally, we perform
one more level of filtering in which we evaluate the malicious hosts identified by the EF
feature family using the Notos [43] reputation system; we remove any hosts identified using
the EF features if Notos does not produce a reputation score below our chosen threshold.
3.3 Dataset Summary
This section describes the datasets used in our analysis. These include pDNS data collected
from a major US cellular carrier, pDNS data collected from a major US non-cellular ISP,
and a database of malicious evidence built from several classes of malicious information.
3.3.1 DNS
Cellular
We observed DNS traffic from a cellular data network on twenty-one days over a three
month period. This data was passively collected from a single sensor that aggregates
information from several cities.
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Table 2: Listing of unique RRs, domains, hosts, and devices seen in cellular dataset.
Duration RRs Domains
(hours) Total New Total New
4/15-4/21 168 8,553,155 8,553,155 8,040,141 8,040,141
5/13-5/19 168 9,240,372 4,498,765 8,711,704 4,042,009
6/17-6/23 168 8,660,555 3,246,194 8,109,536 2,745,999
Total 504 26,454,082 16,298,114 24,861,381 14,828,149
Duration Hosts Devices
(hours) Total New Total Mobile
4/15-4/21 168 2,070,189 2,070,189 157,286,931 121,497,066
5/13-5/19 168 2,168,266 606,467 169,561,760 136,292,358
6/17-6/23 168 2,050,168 377,048 153,525,716 122,747,704




























Figure 5: Per host (in HOSTSall) qname distribution of DNS evidence. These experiments
demonstrates that the hosts in HOSTSall have a significant historic presence in pDNS data
collected from non-cellular networks.
3.3.1.1 Observations from the Cellular Carrier Traffic
Table 2 provides insight into the number of unique RRs, domains, and hosts seen over the
twenty-one (single day) epochs. For each record type, there are two columns that specify
the total number of unique records seen for the given week and the number of new records
not seen in any prior week. Intuitively, the number of new records seen should decrease over
time, and Table 2 shows that the influx of RRs, domains, and hosts does follow this pattern.
Non-cellular
The non-cellular pDNS data was collected from seven different sensors located across
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the US over more than 15 months. Due to the extended collection period, this dataset
presents a substantial volume of traffic that can be used to provide historical context for
domains and hosts of interest. In particular, we can use this data to make inferences about
the hosting infrastructure of a particular domain or tie specific hosts to their related domains.
3.3.2 Devices
Devices seen in the cellular dataset accessed the network via a cellular data connection.
Consequently, these devices should fall into three general categories: smartphones, tablets,
or mobile broadband devices. The first two categories include devices such as Android
and iOS phones and tablets. A mobile broadband device includes any device accessing
the network via a mobile broadband card or tethering to another device’s cellular data
connection. This could include traditional computing devices such as desktop or laptop
computers.
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, we are conservative in the classification of mobile devices;
a comparison of the total devices and what was classified as a mobile device can be seen
in Table 2. Most importantly, this table shows that our estimate of mobile devices is
conservative; we classify only 79% of devices seen as mobile.
3.3.3 Evidence
We analyze cellular DNS traffic with an evidence database composed of three general
classes of non-mobile malicious evidence: public blacklist data (PBL), phishing and drive-
by download evidence (URL), and hosts accessed by known malicious applications (MAL).
In addition to the non-mobile evidence database, we also used a mobile blacklist (MBL)
containing 2,914 domains known to be associated with mobile malware or mobile malware
operators. Figure 6 shows the volume of DNS lookup requests from mobile devices in our
cellular dataset that could be directly linked with different classes of non-mobile and mobile
evidence.














































Figure 7: Hourly analysis of request volume for various types of domains observed from
mobile devices.
with different types of malicious evidence can be seen in Figure 7. It is important note that
our cellular DNS traffic sensor aggregates data from several different locations in different
time zones. Therefore, patterns may be less pronounced than if all data was collected from a
single location. Looking at the total volume of requests for each hour, Figure 7 shows that
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the volume of traffic starts to increase between hours five and six and begins to gradually
decrease between hours seventeen and eighteen. These hours approximately correspond
to people waking up in the morning and traditional dinner hours in the evening. With the
exception of DDNS traffic and a spike at hour five for MBL requests, the other classes of
domains appear to follow the total hourly volume pattern.
3.4 Results
We now present the results of our experimental evaluation. We begin by analyzing the
traffic observed in the cellular carrier, first characterizing the data from the cellular carrier
in isolation, and then comparing the request patterns to those observed historically in our
non-cellular ISP dataset. We then examine the extent to which the hosts observed in mobile
resolution requests are directly or indirectly tainted by reputation information collected in
non-cellular ISPs.
We continue in Section 3.4.2 and further focus on evidence of mobile-specific malware.
We continue our analysis of directly tainted hosts in mobile resolutions by determining from
which mobile platforms those queries originate. Then, we examine all of the cellular network
queries for mobile-malware specific domains to determine the extent of the presence of
mobile malware in the cellular network.
We conclude our results with long term analysis of two known mobile threats in Sec-
tion 3.4.3. In particular, we study those two threats from their rise until they become almost
completely inactive. Furthermore, we provide the global infection perspective of those two
mobile threats. Finally, we examine their hosting infrastructure and how it changes over
time.
3.4.1 Analysis of the Reputation Datasets
We analyze the DNS traffic generated from approximately 380 million mobile IDs over
the course of our observation period (Table 2). Note that while we can identify devices
consistently within an epoch (i.e., a single day), we can not link devices across days, meaning
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that this total does not represent the number of unique devices serviced by the carrier. We
are specifically interested in unique Internet-based hosts requested by mobile devices. The
filtering process results in the set HOSTSall consisting of 2,902,071 unique hosts having
the following characteristics: (i) at least one resolution request for each host was observed
by the cellular carrier, (ii) the observed DNS requests came strictly from devices classified as
mobile, (iii) the hosts are not associated with any known benign infrastructure, and (iv) the
host is a routable IP address. We obtain passive DNS information on each of these hosts from
our historical non-cellular ISP dataset (via the function fpdns() defined in Section 3.2.3).
3.4.1.1 Observations from the Cellular Carrier Traffic
We use the hosts in HOSTSall to perform an in depth examination of their DNS properties
in our pDNS data. We do this for both the cellular ISP traffic (Figure 5(a)) and, using a
projection into our passive DNS data collection, for the non-cellular ISP traffic (Figure 5(b)).
The hosts in HOSTSall reflect a portion of the hosting infrastructure that support
unknown or malicious types of DNS resolutions in the mobile carrier. We project this set
into the non-cellular data collection and obtain non-cellular passive DNS data for the hosts
in HOSTSall. Only 36,338 (or 1.3%) of hosts in HOSTSall are outside the non-cellular
passive DNS evidence we have.
Looking a bit closer, Figure 5(a) shows the distribution of unique hosts in the set
HOSTSall. We see that more than 18% of the hosts requested by mobile devices are
associated with only a single domain. Furthermore, Figure 5(b) shows that 98.7% of hosts
in the set HOSTSall have at least one historically associated domain name (according to
the passive DNS data collection from the non-cellular ISP). This simply means a sufficiently
large non-cellular pDNS data collection can be used to amplify the DNS information for
hosts observed in DNS resolutions from non-cellular networks.
If we assign Notos [43] reputation scores to the RRs that have IPs in the HOSTSall set,
and use reputation threshold of 0.8 (or above 80% probability of the RR being malicious),
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Google Play* US 9/20/11 and 1/20/12 26,332 27,581 47,144
SoftAndroid RU 2/7/12 3,626 3,028 8,868
ProAndroid CN 2/2/12, 3/11/12 2,407 2,712 8,458





Contagio — 3/27/12 338 246 2,324
Zhou et al. — 2/2012 596 281 2,413
M1 — 3/26/2012 1,485 839 5,540
*Top 500 free applications per category only
we obtain 51,503 domain names (3,636 distinct IPs) as likely suspicious. Only 18 domain
names (13 unique hosts) of them have been listed in mobile black lists until the day of the
submission. While 0.8 is a conservative threshold, these results could be used as an indicator
that the malicious hosting infrastructure observed in cellular networks is already present in
reputation and passive DNS observations from non-cellular networks.
These findings are already valuable. Given the significant overlap between the domains
requested by devices in cellular and non-cellular providers, and the historical information
regarding the reputation of the hosts in HOSTSall (as discussed in this Section and Sec-
tion 3.3.3), we can conclude that the DNS infrastructure (malicious or not) is being reused
in cellular networks. Moreover, the scores assigned to hosts by DNS reputation systems can
potentially serve as filtering functions for applications when they are submitted to mobile
markets.
3.4.1.2 Observations from Mobile Markets and Malware Datasets
We now characterize application markets and datasets of known mobile malicious applica-
tions. Specifically, we examine all of the applications in Proandroid, Sofandroid, Anzhi,
Ndoo and the top 500 free applications from each category in Google Play. We also analyze
three datasets containing known mobile malware, including all of the malware samples from
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Figure 8: Qname distribution per passive DNS (from non-Cellular networks) evidence
gathered from the m&a dataset. In spite of their geographic diversity, the requested qnames
in all of these subsets follow a similar distribution.
the Contagio blog, 596 apps from the malware dataset described in Zhou et al. [252] and a
third dataset which we refer to as M1 that was provided confidentially by an independent
security company. M1 contains both highly suspicious and confirmed malicious applica-
tions. We refer to this collection of datasets as the malware and applications (m&a) datasets
({Android500, P roandroid, Softandroid, Anzhi, Zhou, Contagio,M1}). We statically
extract domain names from application code in the m&a dataset to create a set of domain
names we call DNm&a. Using the fpdns() function, we record the unique hosts historically
associated with each entry in DNm&a from our non-cellular pDNS dataset. Table 3 shows
the breakdown of each of these datasets.
Figures 8(a) and (b) show the distribution of qnames for each of the subsets of the
m&a dataset. We observe that at least 90% of the hosts in HOSTSm&a are present in our
non-cellular pDNS dataset, and in some cases (see Figure 8(b)) all of them are present.
Despite the geographical diversity of the markets we examine, in Figures 8(a) and (b) we
see that all m&a datasets have very similar distributions of qnames per host in HOSTSm&a.
Furthermore, more than 50% of these hosts have at least seven domain names historically
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Figure 9: Volume of malicious MD5 evidence associated with unique qnames seen in the
m&a dataset.
associated with the (non-cellular) pDNS dataset.
Figure 9 shows the direct relationship to hosts historically associated with malware for
each of the subsets of the M&A datasets. We observe that the 38% of the hosts retrieved
from the HOSTSZhoudataset, which corresponds to applications from Zhou et al. [252]
dataset, have been historically associated with more than one malware samples (or MD5).
Additionally, approximately 23% of hosts in HOSTSsoftandroid dataset, can also be linked
with more that one malware samples.
Somewhat unsurprisingly, Google Play (see Figure 9(b), Android 500 class) has the
lowest percentage of applications contacting hosts historically associated with malware.
Only a 10% of the domain names observed in the class Android 500 in Figure 9(b), have more
than one malware sample associated with the host the domain names resolved to historically.
These numbers increase in Figure 10, which shows the projection of HOSTSm&a through
our passive DNS data collection from non-cellular networks using fmal(). As previously
mentioned, such indirect results are prone to false positives due to phenomena like parking
IPs and sinkholes; however, the inclusion of such hosts in an application could easily serve
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Figure 10: Volume of malicious MD5 evidence associated with unique qnames in the m&a
dataset after projection through non-cellular pDNS data collection.
to trigger analysis by market operators.
In summary, mobile applications observed from a variety of marketplaces and malware
datasets use much of the same Internet infrastructure as the non-cellular DNS resolutions.
This observation is similar to the analysis we made in Section 3.4.1.1, when we examined
DNS traffic from a large cellular provider. Perhaps the most important observation from the
m&a datasets is that some market-places (e.g., Softandroid) contain mobile applications
that tend to be more directly and indirectly related with known malware-tainted hosting
infrastructure.
3.4.2 Mobile-malicious activity in mobile networks
This subsection discusses two distinct but related phenomenon: 1) the relationship between
mobile platforms and requests for tainted hosts, and 2) the presence of queries for domains
facilitating malware that targets mobile platforms.
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3.4.2.1 Tainted hosts requested by mobile platforms
Table 4 presents a breakdown of which platforms correspond to what proportion of total
mobile device population, what proportion of the device population requested tainted hosts,
and which platforms are responsible for tainted host requests. This data is presented for iOS
devices and other mobile devices such as Android and other indistinguishable platforms (e.g.,
potentially Symbian, Windows Mobile, unverifiable iOS devices). We separate iOS devices
from the rest because they are easy to reliably identify by searching for push notification
domains.
The first column in Table 4 shows the contribution of each platform to the total population
of mobile devices. The majority of devices were unidentifiable, but roughly one third of the
devices could be identified as iOS. The second column shows the percentage of devices for
each platform that requested domains that point to tainted hosts. We observed roughly 8%
of iOS and 8% of other mobile devices issued at least one request that pointed to a tainted
host.
Finally, the third column shows how platforms contribute to the overall number of tainted
host requests. It is interesting that each class of devices contributed proportionally to the
number of total tainted host requests. This data shows that, from the network perspective,
iOS devices reach out to similar numbers of tainted hosts as other devices.
Figure 5 provides an overview of different threat classes that are present in our PBL
evidence set. Each of the different classes shown in this table were seen in our cellular
pDNS dataset and was visited by a mobile device. It is interesting that this list includes
several prominent desktop malware classes such as Zeus and SpyEye in our filtered mobile
traffic.
3.4.2.2 Mobile malware in the cellular network
To answer the question ”How prevalent is the threat of malicious mobile applications in
the cellular network?”, we scanned all (not mobile-device only) cellular network DNS
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Table 5: Threat Class for Tainted Hosts













data with a blacklist of 2,932 domains known to be associated with mobile-malware or
mobile-malware operators. We then focused on those domains that are known to have
directly facilitated mobile malicious activity, not merely associated with it. Examples of
this malicious activity include distributing malicious applications, exfiltrating sensitive data
without user consent, and command and control services.
We focused on 19 unique domains present in our cellular pDNS data. These mali-
cious domains are associated with 10 unique malware families; all of these are Android
applications. 9 of these 10 malware families were publicly disclosed before any of our
epochs — meaning they were still queried after they were known to be malicious by security
researchers, antivirus companies, and market providers. [7–9, 68, 176, 181, 215, 224, 249]
Table 6 shows the mobile malware families with domains seen in the cellular network,
the number of domains known to facilitate the malicious activities of those families, the
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number of devices of any type and the number of mobile devices that contacted a domain
facilitating mobile malware. Note that this data is aggregate across days and all domains
facilitating mobile malware; we cannot identify the same device across epochs, so this is
an upper bound of devices that contact a domain. The effects of our conservative mobile
classification process are apparent – only a fraction of devices that we classify as mobile
contacted any domain that facilitates mobile malware compared to all devices.
The most prevalent malicious family in the network was FakeDoc. This is a potentially
unwanted application (adware) that steals a user’s Google account and other potentially
sensitive information. FakeDoc was discovered in the Android market on October 19, 2011
well before our traffic epochs. Despite being flagged by several antivirus products [8], 5,417
devices contacted the domain used by FakeDoc for malicious activity.
The second most popular malware family was NotCompatible. NotCompatible is a
trojan application that acts as an open network proxy. Unlike the other families in Table 6,
NotCompatible is spread through compromised web pages with hidden iFrames that point
to a download site for the app. NotCompatible was disclosed on May 2, 2012 [249].
Even considering an upper bound, the overall traffic to domains associated with mobile
malware is quite small. Only 9,033 devices of any type out of a total of over 480M million
(0.001%), and 3,492 devices out of a total of 380M confirmed mobile devices (0.0009%)
contacted a domain known to facilitate mobile malware. The top two threats present in
our data present a stark contrast in functionality, time of known activity, and method of
distribution. Despite these differences, neither presented significant activity levels during
our measurement epochs.
A number of insights can be gleaned from this data. First and foremost, mobile malware
is a real threat to users in the United States, despite the fact that malware researchers find
many of their samples in non-US markets. Even though the threat is real, it is minimal. It
is important to note that the overall size of all infected populations indicates that mobile
malware is far from reaching the scope or severity of desktop malware. This may be
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DroidDreamLight*† 3 150 44
DroidKungFu* 1 19 6
FakeDoc*† 1 5417 2145
Fatakr* 1 328 151
GGTracker* 3 1 1
Gone60*† 1 1 1
NotCompatible 3 2198 762
Plankton*† 4 686 286
Malware β* 1 18 1
WalkInWat* 1 215 95
* Disclosed before any of our epochs
† Distributed in Google Play market
attributed to moderated markets, security architectures of mobile platforms, and the relative
lack of opportunity an infected device can provide a malware author.
The low volumes of traffic from malware distributed through the Google Market indicate
that market-based kill switches can be effective at controlling the malware population.
However, the relative success of NotCompatible calls into question whether the market-
based kill switches will be able to control the spread of malware in the future if malware
authors eschew markets in favor of other distribution means. Even when markets are used
as a distribution channel, mobile malware can be seen in the network long after discovery
by researchers and its removal from markets. This finding implies that neither markets nor
security products like antivirus tools are able to guarantee a malware-free platform.
3.4.3 Lifecycle of Mobile Threats
In this section we examine the evolution of two malicious mobile applications, threat ε and
threat β. With historic data from a large authoritative DNS server, we provide insights on
how the threats developed over time as well as geographical properties of the requesters
requesting domains associated with these threats. We conclude by providing some insight
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Figure 11: DNS request volume for threat ε (2011)
on the hosting infrastructure these mobile threats used throughout their lifetime, especially
at the peak of their activity.
Threat ε is an Android application that masquerades as a legitimate client to a popular
Internet streaming media service. When run, the application presents a credible login screen.
When the user attempts to log in, the application displays an error message and closes. In
the meantime, it has sent the user’s credentials to domain qnameε in an HTTP request. This
threat was publicly disclosed by a major anti-virus company in October 2011.
Threat β is an Android application that starts a service after reboot that periodically
contacts a C&C server hosted on domain qnameβ . The service will respond to commands
received from the C&C or via SMS. One command causes the application to sign all contacts
up to an on-line mailing list, while another command has the application send infected
download links to all contacts via SMS. These links are on a different domain than qnameβ .
The application will automatically respond to received SMS with an offensive message, and
in certain cases will send offensive SMS messages to all contacts. This threat was publicly
disclosed by a major anti-virus company in May 2011.
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Figure 12: DNS request volume for threat β (2010 to 2011)
3.4.3.1 Lifetime and Infection Scale
Figure 11 shows the daily lookup volumes for qnameε, which acts as a proxy for the victims
of threat ε. These lookups could be recursive DNS servers, so we cannot make any claims
about the size of the overall infected population. The threat was most active on April 12th,
but soon after rapidly declines. The first lookup for qnameε was recorded on March 3rd,
2011, and by June 5th 3 there were DNS requests from 2,731 unique requesters. Table 7
shows the query volume, AS, and country code of the top ten networks that sent requests
to qnameε; the majority of these are based in the US. Of note is that this threat seems to
have ended well before it was publicly disclosed in October 2011; at the time of disclosure,
qnameε no longer resolved to a routable address.
Figure 12 shows the lifetime of threat β in terms of query volume. This threat became
active in January of 2010, and at its peak in February – March 2011 it averaged more
than 70,000 DNS requests per day. Over the 14 months that this threat was active, 13,094
unique IP addresses queried the domain name qnameβ. As before, this number cannot be
3 We have no data from the authoritative DNS server after this date, so we have no visibility into later
activity
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Table 7: Requester information with respect to autonomous system (AS), country code (CC),
and count of unique IPs in the AS (volume).
Threat ε Threat β
Volume AS CC Volume AS CC
816 3356 US 7315 3356 US
112 15169 US 470 3462 TW
97 7132 US 266 15169 US
92 9299 PH 222 4766 KR
67 7843 US 210 7132 US
52 20115 US 160 9299 PH
47 6389 US 139 6389 US
44 7643 VN 127 9121 TR
38 22773 US 122 20115 US
33 24560 IN 115 24560 IN
considered an absolute population estimate. Table 7 shows the distribution of the infected
populations for mobile threats β and ε. We see that a significant portion of the infected
population resides in Asia-based networks. We also note that Google (AS 15169) has a
heavy impact on the numbers in Table 7 (most likely due to crawling). Threat εwas disclosed
well past its peak in DNS requests.
3.4.3.2 Hosting Infrastructure
Here we describe in detail the Internet infrastructure used by both threats. Table 8 shows the
autonomous systems, country codes, and the number of hosts within each AS that qnameε
or qnameβ 4 pointed to throughout their lifetime. Figure 13 shows how the host pointed to
by qnameε changed over time. The host was primarily located in AS 6389, but for brief
periods of time the domain resolves to hosts outside AS 6389. Comparing the activity of
threat ε (Figure 11) to the changes in the host (Figure 13) reveal that host changes were
correlated with activity peaks (as seen in April 2011). Figure 14, shows host changes
overtime for threat β. Like threat ε, the host infrastructure was relatively stable until peak
4Only the top four ASes are presented; these comprise all hosts for threat ε and 308 out of the 316 hosts
used by threat β.
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Table 8: Information on the hosting infrastructure used by the two mobile threats.
Threat ε Threat β
Volume AS CC Volume AS CC
11 6389 US 237 6389 US
3 20115 US 28 49544 NL
1 7132 US 28 27589 US
1 13674 US 15 29550 GB
Figure 13: Threat ε’s host infrastructure shows agility comparable to non-mobile botnets
activity (January – June 2011). The changes in this case may have been to add redundancy
to the C&C infrastructure as it grew.
These case studies provide three key insights into the life-cycle of mobile threats. First,
in the case of threat ε, the malicious app was not publicly disclosed until months after its
peak activity. In this case, reactive security measures failed to detect a threat until well after
it was most effective. Second, both of these threats show a growth pattern similar to those
shown in non-mobile malware studies [44]. Third, the agility in the hosting infrastructure
used by these threats does not resemble professional DNS hosting. Rather, they are similar
to non-mobile botnet operators that commonly use tactics like moving to hosts in different
networks and countries to provide agility to their illicit operations. In future work, the agility
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Figure 14: Threat β’s host infrastructure also shows agility comparable to non-mobile
botnets
seen in these mobile threats may be exploited by traditional DNS reputation systems to
detect potentially suspicious domain names in the mobile space.
3.5 Summary
In this paper, we presented a study of traffic obtained from a major US cellular provider as
well as a major US non-cellular Internet service provider. Our work provides an in-depth
understanding of the Internet infrastructure used for mobile malware. In particular, we
showed that the network infrastructure used by mobile applications is part of the core
Internet infrastructure used by applications in the non-cellular world; in other words, the
mobile web is part of the Internet. We presented evidence showing that the mobile malware
discovered by the research community appears in a minuscule number of devices in the
network; this suggests that mobile application markets are already providing adequate
security for a majority of mobile devices. We compared traffic to suspicious hosts between
different mobile device platforms and demonstrated that iOS devices are no less likely than
other platforms to reach out to such devices. Finally, we analyzed two major mobile threats
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and found that their network characteristics are similar to those of non-cellular botnets.
Overall, these findings suggest that there are commonalities, in terms of both network
infrastructure and characteristics, between malicious mobile applications and non-cellular
malware. Therefore, we should leverage our successful experiences with DNS monitoring
and reputation systems for non-cellular ISPs to develop a similar system for cellular carriers
to identify (emerging) mobile threats. We leave this as a future work.
47
CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EXPIRED DOMAIN ABUSE
4.1 Motivation
Domain names have become the Internet’s de facto root of trust. In practice, they are also
a root of insecurity as common security systems depend on the unfounded assumption
that domain ownership remains constant; this leaves users vulnerable to exploitation when
domain ownership changes. For instance, authentication systems often rely on email to reset
user passwords. Such schemes fail when the domain for that credential changes ownership—
e.g., by expiration, auction, or transfer—and thus is no longer associated with the original
owner. Consequently, an adversary can exploit this vulnerability to hijack the email address
via a malicious re-registration of the domain.
In this chapter, we study the exploitation of domain ownership changes and find that the
phenomenon of residual trust abuse is the underlying cause of many, seemingly disparate,
security issues. Among these, we found vulnerabilities allowing an attacker to maliciously
register a domain to: (i) siphon University traffic and email by exploiting expired nameserver
domains; (ii) hijack Regional Internet Registry (RIR) accounts and allocate IP addresses
using expired email domains; and (iii) distribute malicious updates for benign software,
including an instance that left users of a major Linux distribution vulnerable. The pre-
ceding examples demonstrate that even a single instance of residual trust abuse has major
implications for the security of users and systems alike.
Despite the serious consequences of malicious registrations, the scope of the phenomenon
has yet to be rigorously characterized and quantified. Our study seeks to fill this knowledge
gap. Using data collected over six years, we show that adversaries are actively exploiting
residual trust. To quantify this, we analyze the overlap between expired domains and both
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(i) hand-curated lists of malicious domains, i.e., public blacklists; and (ii) domains queried
by malware, as such queries are an indicator of abuse. We find that almost 8.7% of the
domain names that appeared on public blacklists (since 2009) were listed after the domains
expired and changed ownership. In other words, over the last six years at least 27,758
were abusing residual trust. Similarly, we identified 238,279 domains that expired, were
re-registered, and then contacted by malware—indicating likely malicious registrations.
These domains account for 3.9% of all domains resolved by malware in our dataset. To
put this into perspective, the size of this set is comparable to the 320,009 domains listed
on public blacklists since 2009. Even more, empirical evidence suggests this is a rapidly
growing problem. We found the exploitation of ownership changes has grown by orders of
magnitude since we began collecting data. Between 2009 and 2012 there were 784 observed
blacklist instances of abuse, but in 2014 alone, that number increased to over 9,000. We
observed similar growth for expired domains resolved by malware, indicating this trend is
not unique to blacklists.
In light of the increasing abuse of residual trust—e.g., malicious re-registration of
domain names—better tools and policies are necessary to ensure the security of both users
and systems. We argue that a comprehensive solution must consider both technical and
non-technical remedies. For the former we propose Alembic, a lightweight algorithm that
can be used to identify likely changes in ownership. This algorithm scales to large amounts
of traffic, requires only access to historical DNS data, and ranks likely changes in domain
ownership. Using our algorithm, we were able to identify several cases of potential residual
trust abuse, including a currently expired advanced persistent threat (APT) domain. The
expired APT domain example demonstrates how easily domains with negative residual trust
can be used to revive existing infections. For the non-technical remedies, we discuss several
potential policy changes and their implementation challenges.
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4.1.1 Contributions
We introduce the concept of residual trust and, using numerous real world cases of domain
misuse, demonstrate how it is the underlying cause of many seemingly disparate security
problems. Furthermore, we distinguish between positive and negative residual trust and
discuss how each could be abused or cause unintended consequences.
We provide the first large-scale analysis of residual trust abuse by using several large
datasets for expired domains, passive DNS, network malware traces, and aggregated public
blacklists. Our observations show malicious parties are actively abusing residual trust and
that it is a growing problem.
We propose a technical remedy and discuss several non-technical remedies to help
deal with the growing abuse of residual trust. For the former, we introduce a lightweight
algorithm, Alembic, to help locate likely ownership changes. While identifying changes
in domain ownership would appear to be straightforward using WHOIS information [77],
mining WHOIS is a challenging and resource-intensive task. Some researchers are trying
to solve this problem with better automated solutions [156], but this does not address the
problem that simply obtaining WHOIS information is expensive and hard to scale. Further,
WHOIS information is rarely available in bulk. It is common for registry access to be limited
to just a handful of queries (less than 1000) per day from a given host. While there are
commercial companies offering limited API-based access to WHOIS information [17,28,29],
they are cost-prohibitive and lack external validation. Due to the previously mentioned
WHOIS limitations, it is outside the capabilities of most practitioners, research groups, and
all but a handful of organizations to generate a comprehensive set of historic WHOIS records
through which domain ownership changes can be identified. These above constraints make
building a traditional detection system for domain ownership changes extremely difficult.
Therefore, we chose to create an efficient and highly scalable algorithm that helps find
potential domain ownership changes using only DNS information. Using our algorithm, we
find several previously unidentified instances of abuse, including an expired APT domain.
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4.2 Abusing Residual Trust
In this section, we discuss five real world examples of residual trust abuse that exploit
expired domains previously used for a variety of Internet functions and services—including
university DNS servers, CIDR allocations from Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), browser
extensions, open source software, and promotional media content. These case studies
demonstrate the unintended consequences that result from the residual trust placed upon
domains by both users and systems. Our goal is to introduce the reader to the scope and
severity of the problems caused by expired domains with concrete examples. Furthermore,
these examples demonstrate that many seemingly disparate security issues actually share a
common underlying cause: residual trust in domains.
4.2.1 Expired Nameserver Domains
In our first example, one of the DNS nameserver domains for the Benedictine University
expired—potentially leaking sensitive university emails to the domain’s new owners. Ac-
cording to our passive DNS sources, the ben.edu domain owned by Benedictine University
used the following nameservers, among others, in 2012:
ben.edu. IN NS ns1.bobbroadband.com.
ben.edu. IN NS ns2.bobbroadband.com.
In other words, the hosts under bobbroadband.com provided secondary NS service
for the university. It is common for organizations to rely on secondary DNS services from
other organizations, often in different TLDs, to provide power and geographic diversity
for their DNS. Consequently, the expiration of bobbroadband.com did not disrupt
resolution of ben.edu as other DNS authorities were still available. Then, on October 25,
2012, the nameservers for bobbroadband.com were switched to the following:
bobbroadband.com. IN NS ns1.pendingrenewaldeletion.com.
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Figure 15: Residual Trust Exploitation in University DNS Servers
The zone pendingrenewaldeletion.com is a special zone used by the registrar
to manage the final stages of the domain through to the redemption grace period. The reader
should note that the redemption grace period (described in Section 2.1.3) is designed to
cause an outage as a final way to notify a domain owner of an expiration. In this case,
however, the redemption grace period process did not disrupt the university’s DNS because
other nameservers were still providing service. Ironically, the resiliency of DNS prevented
the redemption grace period process from providing one last notice-through-outage to users.
After the domain expired completely, it was purchased by a search engine optimization
(SEO) company that then responded to all domain queries with a wild-card answer. This
directed all traffic destined for ben.edu (e.g., HTTP traffic, email, etc.) to an advertising
site. These events are summarized in Figure 15.
This change is especially subtle because it was the domain of one of the nameservers for
ben.edu that expired and not the university’s own DNS record. Furthermore, the university
still had other nameservers that would direct traffic to the school’s servers, preventing the
outage from occurring after every TTL for a given record. Thus, the outage intermittently
manifested itself only if the nameserver handling a resolution was the one controlled by the
SEO company—not one of the remaining authorities operated by the school.
Given the legal protections generally afforded to student emails, the ad company likely
had no right to the traffic despite owning the domain. Clearly, there existed residual trust in
the expired bobbroadband.com domain since an entire university depended upon it.
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In a subsequent survey of the edu TLD, we identified nearly a hundred expired zones
under the TLD. We offered our survey results of possible outages, similar to ben.edu,
to the DNS community. An enterprise DNS company now provides secondary services
for schools that formerly relied on expired or expiring secondary nameservers. While the
problems caused in this example were many, the underlying cause was simple: residual trust
in domains.
4.2.2 Expired Email Domains
In our second case study, we show how expired domain names could affect Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs) operators. The RIRs locally administer the allocation of IP addresses [120]
and maintain a database of which individuals have been allocated a specific Classless Inter-
Domain Routing (CIDR) network. Stolen or hijacked RIR credentials can, therefore, lead to
serious security incidents.
Account information for the RIR is protected using email as a trust anchor, and therefore,
trust is effectively placed in whoever owns the domain specified by an email address. A
simple check of the RIR databases yields all of the email addresses for CIDR operators, and
registration checks on these domains indicated that hundreds of technical and administrative
point-of-contact (PoC) listings were under expired domains.1
In all cases of expired contact details, we found either the notify or abuse-mailbox
fields for inetnum and aut-num RIR objects contained emails under expired domains.
One could simply register these domains, request a password reset, and log into the manage-
ment interface to manage the allocated CIDRs. Indeed, there are several cases where this
technique was abused to send spam [209].
We were in the process of notifying the various RIRs of our discovery when other
researchers made public a technical report on this general problem [201]. Their work
1To verify the expiration of each domain, we used a domain reseller account to access the parent registry
via Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) [124]. This step was necessary as DNS lookups resulting in
RCODE=3 or NXDOMAIN merely indicate the absence of records in a zone, not the availability of the record
for registration. For a discussion of EPP use, we refer the reader to [117].
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focused just on RIR objects, but we believe it supports our general focus on techniques to
identify and manage expired domains. We continue to work through our RIR notification
process and, therefore, omit listing the affected domains.
Like the previous case study, the underlying cause of this problem is residual trust. Email
is regularly used as a trust anchor for online services and email addresses fundamentally
rely on domains. Consequently, possession of a domain is often sufficient to demonstrate
ownership of RIR CIDR allocations.
4.2.3 Expired Browser-Related Domains
Residual trust also offers an avenue for exploiting software. For example, many browser
plugins contact one or more domains on startup to load both settings and content. To
quantify this problem, we inspected approximately forty thousand plugins (many with
different versions) from the Mozilla store. Specifically, we examined the online credentials
of the authors, sites contacted by the plugins, and the author’s contact information in the XPI
manifest files. We found some 159 expired domains available for immediate registration.
Anyone could register one of these expired domains used by popular web browser
plugins, some with tens of thousands of installations. This creates the possibility for a
new owner to push updates to the plugin or to potentially take ownership of the associated
developer account. While users may have trusted the original plugin developer, this trust
should not extend to the new owners of the domains used by the plugin. This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that users will be unaware of such ownership changes. Given that
browser plugins can modify browser settings and behavior, this leads to potential security
problems that are difficult to diagnose.
Our goal here is not to simply identify another browser plugin vulnerability. Other
researchers have addressed other security aspects of browser extensions [56, 57, 67, 137] by
analyzing the behavior and structure of browser plugins. Indeed, our analysis of this space
was aided by the tools and frameworks noted above. Rather, this case identifies yet another
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instance of the unintended consequences caused by residual trust in domains. While existing
work may stop potential abuse of this vector, we argue that the change in ownership of
plugin domains is better dealt with by addressing the root cause: residual trust in domains.
4.2.4 Expired Open Source Software Domains
Residual trust from domain expirations also affects software repositories. Recently, the
photo editing tool Gimp failed to renew its domain name, gimp.org. Fortunately, users
noted the outage (days after the failed registration) [202] and reported the problem. This
allowed the domain to be recovered during the grace period—before a malicious registrant
could obtain the domain and offer corrupted versions of the software.
A more disquieting outcome was seen in the recent “Debian multimedia” episode. For a
while, an unaffiliated party operated an unofficial Debian repository mirror of multimedia
applications (many of which did not meet the license requirements for the official Debian
distribution). The domain debian-multimedia.org became popular and was linked
to by various blogs, HOWTO articles, and software sites. Consequently, the site was added to
the Advanced Packaging Tool mirror list for many Debian users. After some discussion with
the maintainers of the official Debian distribution, the debian-multimedia.org owner
agreed to create a new domain called deb-multimedia.org to avoid any indication of
official endorsement. The previous debian-multimedia.org site later expired and
was registered by a party unknown to the Debian community.
In effect, the new site owner had the ability to push software updates. This capability
could be used to offer updates for even non-multimedia related packages such as the kernel
or the base system. While a repository key system offered users the option to protect their
updates, many users may choose to ignore warnings or may not have installed a key for
the old site. This risk compelled the Debian maintainers to release a warning to end users
instructing them to manually remove the old repository domain [217]. The notice alerted us
to the problem, which we diagnosed as yet another symptom of a larger problem: residual
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trust in domains.
As noted above, there are protections against abuses in this dimension: software signing,
local mirrors, staggered distributions in networks, rollbacks, and the like. But it is not
clear if these solutions can be universally adopted by end users—many of whom simply
wanted non-free multimedia software and followed well-intentioned but incomplete Internet
resources. Instead of addressing the specifics of this challenging security area (the signing
and verification of distributed software systems), we argue for a root-cause treatment of the
problem: identifying changes in ownership of expired domains with residual trust.
4.2.5 Expired Spam Domains
In the previous cases studies, we examined cases where positive residual trust could be
abused for malicious purposes, but we have yet to discuss the implications of domains
carrying negative residual trust. Similar to benign domains, domains used for abuse often
expire, and when this happens, they can be registered by new owners intending to use them
for non-abusive purposes. But what happens when the new owner goes to share that newly
purchased domain? Not surprisingly, the new owner may be censored by the same automatic
safeguards put in place to protect online communities. Most maintainers of security lists or
products will be completely unaware of ownership changes, and it may take a considerable
amount of time before a domain is reclassified as non-abusive.
A public instance of this happened back in 2013 when Kirk Cameron released the
film Unstoppable, a Christian movie targeting religious moviegoers [107]. A domain was
purchased to market the film on the Internet, but this domain had previously been used
to send spam—a fact presumably unknown the film’s creators. Consequently, when this
domain was used to market the film on Facebook, it was blocked by Facebook’s automated
spam detection systems. This led to heavily publicized outcries of censorship by the
movie’s producer and fans. Even after disclosing that the domain had been blocked by
their automated spam detection systems, numerous articles decrying Facebook’s censorship
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practices remained without update. Such claims of censorship, even after proven false, are a
risk and a liability for a social network with millions of users of differing beliefs and world
views.
Ultimately, this is yet another unintended consequence of the residual trust placed in
domains. This incident could have been prevented if there were better systems in place to
evaluate the trust associated with domains. Such systems could inform potential registrants
of a domain’s history before purchase or update security products after domain ownership
changes.
4.3 Measuring Residual Trust Abuse
In this section, we take a step back from looking at the specific cases of abuse and instead
analyze the problem of residual trust abuse at scale. In particular, we analyze expired
domains and malicious re-registrations from the past six years (2009–2015). We aggregate
data from public blacklists, malware feeds, gTLD zone files, and other sources to measure
the scope and growth of residual trust abuse. In summary:
• Measuring Scope. To measure scope, we identify and characterize expired domains
associated with malicious behavior. In particular, we focus on expired domain names
found on public blacklists or resolved by malware over the last six years. Our goal, in
part, is to quantify the extent to which expired domains are exploited via malicious
re-registration.
• Measuring Growth. For growth, we study the change in residual trust abuse over time
by leveraging the temporal properties of our dataset. We measure when the domains
expired and when they were used for abuse, allowing us to calculate the number of
active instances of residual trust abuse.
Before diving into the results, we begin with a short discussion of the datasets used for our
measurement study.
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Table 9: In addition to the relative sizes of each set, this figure shows the relationships
between the datasets of expired DG, malware DM , and public blacklist DB domains.
Dataset Cardinalities
DG DM DB DM ∪DB
179,326,265 6,112,964 320,009 6,395,634
Datasets Dataset Intersections
A B %A A ∩B %B
DG ∩ DB 0.1% 101,322 31.7%
DG ∩ DM 0.2% 292,494 4.8%
DM ∩ DB 0.1% 8,075 2.5%
DG ∩ (DM ∪DB) 0.2% 385,741 6.0%
4.3.1 Measurement Datasets
Restricting our observation period to 2009–2015, we focus on the domains that were (i)
observed to expire, (ii) placed on a public blacklist, or (iii) resolved by malware. The
intersection between domains that expired and that were used for abuse yields sets of
domains that are likely targets of residual trust abuse—possibly resulting in a malicious
re-registration. In the following sections, we define these three sets of domains and provide
greater detail about their contents.
4.3.1.1 Expired domains (DG)
We calculated the set of expired domains DG by comparing successive gTLD zone transfers
and recording removals. While the removal of a domain from a zone is a strong indicator of
expiration, we further vetted such domains through the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
(EPP) [124] using the domain reseller account noted in Section 4.2. Finally, we augmented
DG with data obtained from a commercial drop-catch registration service [25].
Our DG set consists of expired domains spanning November 2008 to July 2015 and
contains 179,326,265 unique domains. Most commonly, the DG domains expired due to the
registrant’s failure to re-register the domain. In a few cases, the domain changed ownership
due to a trademark dispute [126], suspension, or registry action stemming from a court order.
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4.3.1.2 Blacklist domains (DB)
The set DB is an aggregation of eight public blacklists (Table 10) collected from December
2009 to July 2015. As such, it includes several different types of malicious behavior from
botnets to drive-by downloads. Importantly, DB represents a human-curated list of domains
associated with undesirable behavior. In total, there are 320,009 unique domains in this set.
We use temporal information from our sources to determine whether a domain was added to
a blacklist (DB) before or after it expired (DG).
4.3.1.3 Malware domains (DM )
DM is a set of domains known to have been queried by malware. This set is compiled
from three dynamic malware execution feeds: one academic and two commercial. These
frameworks employ dynamic analysis to derive network and system indicators from binaries.
These indicators often include URLs used for malicious purposes, e.g., command and control
or advertisement fraud.
This dataset also contains temporal information for the malware execution (i.e., times-
tamp and DNS query), allowing us to determine whether the domain was used by malware
before or after its expiration. DM contains domains from seven years, occurring between
the beginning of 2009 and July 2015, of malware execution traces from the aforementioned
feeds and contains 6,112,964 unique domain names in total.
While not a guarantee of maliciousness, the domains logged by these systems adds a
useful perspective to our analysis. This is especially true for those domains that appeared in
a dynamic analysis trace after an ownership change. The reader should perceive this DM set
as an indicator, not a guarantee, of abusive behavior.
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Table 10: Blacklist sources for DB.
Blacklist Target Source
Abuse.ch Malware, C&C. [18]
Malware DL Malware. [26]
Blackhole DNS Malware, Spyware. [19]
sagadc Malware, Fraud, SPAM. [23]
hphosts Malware, Fraud, Ad tracking. [21]
SANS Aggregate list. [24]
itmate Malicious Webpages. [22]
driveby Drive-by downloads. [20]
4.3.1.4 Potentially abused expired domains (DZ)
Finally, we define the set of all domains that expired and were potential targets of residual
trust abuse as DZ = DG ∩ (DM ∪DB).2 In the context of this study, DZ acts as an upper
bound on the number of expired domains witnessed between 2009 and 2015 that appeared
on human-curated blacklists or that were resolved by malware. A summary describing
the relationships between each of the above datasets can be seen in Table 9. In total, DZ
comprises 385,741 domains.
4.3.2 Measuring Active Residual Trust Abuse
In order to measure active instances of residual trust abuse, we focus on domains that have
expired (DG) and also appear on blacklists (DB) or are resolved by malware (DM ). This set,
DZ , contains domains that are likely candidates for residual trust abuse through malicious
re-registration of the domain. While the majority, 292,494 (75.8%), of the domains in DZ
were associated with malware resolutions, almost a third, 101,322 (31.7%), appeared on at
least one hand-curated public blacklist. These numbers indicate that a substantial portion of
the expired domains were manually linked with abusive behavior. This raises an interesting
question. Did the expiration occur before or after abuse?
Table 11 summarizes the measurement observations behind the domain names that
2The Z in DZ stands for zombie. Similarly, the G in DG stands for graveyard. These identifiers, as well as
the paper’s title, are in reference to the similarities between reanimated (i.e., re-registered) domains and the
depictions of zombies in popular media.
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Table 11: A breakdown of how many domains expired before and after abuse for expired
blacklist (DG ∩DB), malware (DG ∩DM ), and all abusive (DZ) domains—as well as the
average number of days between abuse and expiration.
Expired Before Abuse
DZ DG ∩DM DG ∩DB
Num. of Domains 263,847 238,279 27,758
Avg. Days 888 911 692
Abused Before Expiration
DZ DG ∩DM DG ∩DB
Num. of Domains 123,396 54,215 73,564
Avg. Days 364 397 340
expired and also appeared in our public blacklist and malware datasets. From DZ , we
observed 123,396 domains that existed in DM ∪DB before appearing in DG. In short, these
domains were used for abusive behavior before they expired. From this subset, 54,215
(43.9%) were contacted by malware and 73,564 (59.6%) appeared on public blacklists.
Additionally, 4,748 (8.8%) of the domains contacted by malware also appeared on a public
blacklist. Given their historical association with malicious behavior, these domains represent
instances of negative residual trust.
Security practitioners can leverage domains with such trust for good by using them for
different reconnaissance techniques like sinkholing. It is also important to note that negative
residual trust can be used for malicious purposes as well. For example, an APT actor could
use an expired spam-related domain to camouflage itself as a different type of threat; this
would likely stymie discovery or attack attribution.
Conversely, we observed 263,847 domains that expired before appearing in DM ∪DB.
More specifically, 238,279 (90.3%) domains were contacted by malware and 27,758 (10.5%)
appeared on public blacklists only after expiring. Therefore, these domains represent cases
of positive residual trust potentially being used for illicit activities. By registering expiring
domains, bad actors can leverage the benefits of any positive reputation (such as brand and
industry sector properties) previously held by a domain. Previously, we highlighted several
concrete instances of this problem (Section 4.2). This problem is worsened by the fact that
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benign domains often remain on whitelists after ownership changes due to the difficulty
of discovering such events. This is highlighted by the fact that only 3,327 (1.4%) of the
domains that expired before being contacted by malware ever appeared on a PBL.
To better understand the types of malware that might be abusing residual trust, we
categorized some of the different types of malware observed in DZ . Table 13 shows the
top 10 malware types and families for the malware observed communicating with a simple
random sample of 10,000 domains that expired and then were potentially used for abuse.
Trojans are by far the most common type, with many generic types such as “malware” and
“heuristic” following. The families are similarly dominated by heuristically determined
labels and a few family specific labels. For example, VB.SMIS and Vobfus are generic
labels for obfuscated malware written in Visual Basic. While there are instances where
the MD5 is flagged as benign by the AV engines, most are malicious. As more evidence
of maliciousness, 915 of the 1,559 registrars were used for registering privacy protected
domain names to mask the registrant’s email address and name. While there are legitimate
reasons to use such a service, they are commonly employed by malicious actors to evade
WHOIS attribution.
Finally, we provide a breakdown of the top-level domains (TLDs) in DZ in Table 12.
The distribution largely corresponds to the general popularity of each respective TLD. The
potential exception is edu. We observed proportionally more edu domains being used for
malicious purposes after expiration—possibly due to the inherent trust users place in the
educational TLD.
4.3.3 Measuring Temporal Properties of Residual Trust Abuse
Next, we focus our analysis on the temporal properties of residual trust. We start by referring
the reader to Figure 17, which shows the distribution of deltas between expiration and
first indicator of potential abuse. On average, this delta was around a year for domains
contacted by malware or appeared on blacklists. The extended length of this dormancy
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Figure 16: Expiration date of a domain versus its first blacklist appearance or contact by
malware. Each point represents one of the 27,758 (27.4% of DB) or 238,279 (81.5% of
DM ) distinct domains that expired and later appeared on a public blacklist; the dot’s color
corresponds to the domain’s Alexa rank when it was added to the whitelist. The frequency
of residual trust abuse has grown by multiple orders of magnitude since we began collecting
data in 2009.
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period suggests that it may take a considerable amount of time before the trustworthiness of
the current domain owner can be ascertained. Therefore, not only must changes in ownership
be detected but such changes should be monitored until the new owner’s trustworthiness can
be determined.
Diving deeper into the domains that expired before being used for abuse, we find that the
delta between the last indicator of abuse and the expiration event was roughly two years on
average. The full distribution of these deltas can be seen in Figure 17 and shows two peaks,
appearing approximately one year apart, for domains contacted by malware or appearing on
public blacklists before expiring. The two peaks represent a small number of domains and
are an artifact of shared expiration events for domains in DM ∩DB.
The long delay between last observed malware communication and expiration could be
due to several factors. For example, in order to maximize the utility of malicious domains,
malware authors may choose not to allow a domain to expire until the number of malicious
connections to that domain drops below some threshold (i.e., the domain could still being
monetized by the botmaster). Additionally, a malware author may choose to prevent a
domain from expiring in order to restrict security practitioners from taking over the domain.
4.3.4 Measuring the Growth of Residual Trust Abuse
Figure 16 shows residual-trust abuse is becoming more common. The number of domains
being contacted by malware after expiration grew from 6,138 between 2009 and 2012 to
over 12,000 in just 2013. Similarly, the number of previously expired domains subsequently
appearing on blacklists has grown from 784 between 2009 and 2012 to over 9,000 in 2014
alone. Further, more than 100 of these domains were ranked in the top 10,000 by Alexa
on the day they were added to the blacklist. The horizontal striations in the figure are an
artifact of malware collection and blacklisting processes. Namely, the feed operator may
add many domains (possibly for the same threat) on the same day. Similarly, the vertical
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Figure 17: Distribution of the number of days between domain expiration and contact by
malware or appearance on a public blacklist. This figure shows there is often a significant
dormancy period before the residual trust of a domain is abused.
our collection framework.
4.4 Alembic
The previous discussion illustrated numerous studies, experiments, and anecdotes wherein
expired domains with residual trust resulted in security problems or potential risks to users.
While many of these cases might be remedied using well-founded research and existing
technologies around phishing, DNS poisoning, and key management, it would be useful to
have a system that prevents the problem from escalating in the first place. In this section, we
leverage our previous findings to take the first steps toward such a system.
At first blush, the WHOIS protocol [28] appears to be an ideal candidate to address
this question of identity. Unfortunately, WHOIS suffers from a number of limitations that
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Table 12: TLD frequency for domains in DZ . This includes all domains that were used for
abuse and expired at some point. In total, we observed 13 TLDs used by these domains.
Expired to Malicious Malicious to Expired
TLD Count TLD Count
com 214,019 com 85,409
net 27,621 net 15,954
org 9,648 info 9,287
info 5,575 org 5,869
us 2,671 biz 3,226
biz 2,185 us 2,458
ca 846 cn 989
cn 646 mobi 76
co 175 asia 56
edu 146 ca 45
mobi 80 edu 15
asia 35 co 11
de 20 de 1
make it ill-suited to deploy on a large-scale: (a) lack of verification of data, (b) expense in
scaling queries across all registries and thick registrar WHOIS servers (many of whom limit
queries to a handful per day); (c) lack of structure to data; and (d) lack of historical data in
bulk form. We therefore explored techniques using other data more likely to be available to
network operators: passive DNS logs.
The result of our efforts is Alembic, a general algorithm to assist in locating potential
changes in domain name ownership and identifying reanimated domains. This algorithm
scales without the need to mine resources such as WHOIS data and could be implemented
by any network operators (or researchers) with access to DNS logs.
We measure the effectiveness of the Alembic algorithm using a multi-year passive DNS
dataset obtained from commodity sources. As noted above, the goal of Alembic is to help
identify potential changes in domain ownership without the expense and complexity of
mining enormous volumes of WHOIS data.
Finally, we discuss two instances of residual trust abuse encountered during our evalua-
tion. Interestingly, one of these included witnessing signs of an APT attack against sensitive
networks. Finding trivially weaponizable APT domains was beyond our initial goals, but
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Table 13: Top 10 malware types and families from Kaspersky/Sophos/TrendMicro for
10,000 randomly selected samples from DM .
Type Count Family Count
Trojan 11,979 VB.SMIS 2,449
Malware 5,436 Heuristic 2,271
Heuristic 2,271 VBCheMan-A 2,001
Worm 783 Generic 1,573
Not Malicious 486 Vobfus.M 1,014
W32 286 StartP-HV 995
Backdoor 216 Paskod-A 868
Undesirable Software 191 Not Malicious 486
Virus 86 Paskod-D 481
Packed 43 Download Agent 413
this result indicates the sensitivity of our approach and suggests other possible uses.
4.4.1 Inputs to Alembic
In order to scale and identify domains that have changed owners without expiring, we must
devise an algorithm to assist in locating ownership change events, independent of WHOIS
data. To achieve this, we rely on two datasets: a large passive DNS dataset to identify
significant changes in infrastructure and client lookup volumes, and historic records of
domain name start of authority to locate structural changes to the domain’s zone.
There are many commercial and public passive DNS systems which collect and archive
historic DNS traffic. Many organizations archive their own DNS answers, and security
companies routinely maintain phone book type lists of where domains historically pointed.
Readers not familiar with passive DNS may wish to consult [236]. Because we needed bulk
quantities of passive DNS, we used a private collection instead of other publicly available
DNS services (which often permit non-bulk API access).
Our dataset is sizable and includes historic resolutions that occurred across an entire
North American ISP from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2014. For each day, this data
contains: all domain names that were resolved, the IP addresses they resolved to, and the
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Figure 18: Using different components to identify ownership changes.
and IP address tuple). Using this data we can identify significant changes in domain name
infrastructure and lookup volume—both attributes are useful for Alembic’s operation.
Start of authority, or SOA, records specify authoritative information about a particular
DNS zone. They contain the primary name server (the MNAME under RFC 1034 [164]), the
email of the domain name administrator (or RNAME field), and other unique attributes of the
zone.3 Substantial changes in both the email and primary name server are strong indicators
in ownership change for a given domain name. We therefore performed historical queries
for SOA records for all the domains in DZ .
4.4.2 Design of Alembic
We now describe how, using the aforementioned datasets, we identify domain names most
likely to have undergone a change in ownership. We call our algorithm Alembic, after
the still used by alchemists. Alembic lets us distill historical passive DNS evidence into
a ranking of dates, and corresponding ranges, that are most likely to be associated with a
change in domain ownership.
First, we discuss how we combine temporal changes in infrastructure, lookup volume,
and SOA records into component scores. Then, we discuss how we generate the necessary
inputs to compute these scores and how they are used to generate rankings of likely domain
3Those not familiar with DNS zones and DNS record types may wish to consult [232].
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ownership changes.
4.4.2.1 Computing Component Scores
The Alembic algorithm is based upon the hypothesis that changes in ownership are highly
likely to be accompanied by changes in network infrastructure, lookup volumes, and zone
structure. While some users registering expired domains might be able to create the exact
same zone content, host the nameservers at the same IPs, and generate the same SOA records,
it is presumed this sort of subterfuge is both difficult and rare. This heuristic therefore
comes down to the following conjecture: While one can perhaps buy any desired domain,
one cannot so easily obtain its old IP address and use the same nameservers to manage the
re-registered domain.
In order to identify these potential changes, the algorithm uses a temporal sliding window
to measure changes in each component as observed in passive DNS resolutions over time.
An overview of how the window and components fit together can be viewed in Figure 18. A
summary of each individual component follows below.
Infrastructure Changes. For given a temporal window, W , we compute the Jaccard
distance between hosts observed during the first and second portion of the window; this
measures the dissimilarity between hosts seen during each period of time. In Algorithm 2,
this measurement is computed by the INFRA-SCORE function. The computed score will
range from zero to one where zero indicates the sets are exactly the same and one indicates
that the two sets are completely disjoint.
Lookup Volume. Similarly, the distribution of lookup volumes for a given domain is split
into two intervals for the current temporal window, W . We compute a t-test between the two
distributions to measure if the null hypothesis (i.e., whether there is no relationship between
them) is supported. This returns both a t-score and a p-value. The p-value ranges between
zero and one with a lower p-value suggesting that the observed distributions are more likely
to be consistent with the null hypothesis. Thus, a lower p-value suggests that the distributions
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are more likely to be different and a higher p-value suggests that the distributions are more
likely to be similar. The VOL-SCORE function in Algorithm 2 shows that the volume score
is computed as one minus the p-value which results in dissimilar distributions receiving a
higher score.
SOA Differences. Like the previous two cases, we compute a score based on observations
about the difference between the first and second portion of the current temporal window, W .
In particular, we measure changes to SOA records observed during these two intervals. Each
SOA record contains two fields of interest: an authoritative nameserver, MNAME, and an
e-mail address, RNAME, for the individual responsible for the zone. We measure changes to
each of these fields independently in order to finely measure changes in SOA records. Thus,
we compute the Jaccard distance between the set of MNAMEs observed in each portion of W ,
and separately, we compute the Jaccard distance between the set of RNAMEs observed in
each portion of W . The SOA-SCORE function, in Algorithm 2, shows how we compute the
overall score for changes in SOA records, and like the previous component scores, higher
values indicate there were more changes between the first and second portion of the temporal
window.
4.4.2.2 Alembic Algorithm
The Alembic algorithm uses the component scores to generate rankings of likely domain
ownership changes. Algorithm 3 presents a pseudo-code implementation of the Alembic
algorithm.
The first step in the algorithm is to choose a window W . This window defines the
number of days worth of passive DNS data, around some date d, required for the algorithm
to compute a change in ownership score. For example, if W = 14, then seven days worth of
records before and after d are necessary for the algorithm to run; if insufficient records are
available, the algorithm simply returns zero. In Algorithm 3, this process results in hi and
hj , which are sets of hosts seen in A records W2 days before and after d. These sets are used
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Algorithm 2: Computing Component Scores()
function INFRA-SCORE(hi, hj):
return 1 - JACCARD-INDEX(hi, hj)
end
function VOL-SCORE(vi, vj):
t val, p val← TTEST(vi, vj)
return 1− p val
end
function SOA-SCORE(si, sj):
mi, ri ← si









as the input to INFRA-SCORE to compute the infrastructure component score.
Since not all domains will have W contiguous days worth of records around d, the
algorithm tries to pick the W
2
closest days before and after d. This may result in date ranges
of varying size for each half of W . Therefore, we compute the date range for a window, W ,
by finding the minimum date, di, associated with the records in hi and the maximum date,
dj , associated with the records in hj .
We use the date ranges [di, d] and (d, dj] to compute the lookup volume distributions for
each portion of W around d. If we do not have lookup volumes associated with a date in
one of these ranges, we assign it a lookup volume of zero; this imbues information about
how frequently the given domain is resolved. The lookup volume distributions for each
date range, vi and vj , are given as inputs to the VOL-SCORE to compute the lookup volume
component score.
Next, the SOA records observed between the date ranges [di, d] and (d, dj] are placed
into two sets, si and sj , and these sets are given as parameters to SOA-SCORE to compute
the SOA component score.
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Algorithm 3: Alembic Algorithm
function ALEMBIC(d, h, v, s):
W ← window size
if |h| ≥ W then
hi ← W2 records before date d in h
hj ← W2 records after date d in h
scoreh ← INFRA-SCORE(hi, hj)
di ← minimum date for record in hi
dj ← maximum date for record in hj
vi ← lookup distribution between [di, d] in v
vj ← lookup distribution between (d, dj] in v
scorev ← VOL-SCORE(vi, vj)
si ← SOA records seen between [di, d] in s
sj ← SOA records seen between (d, dj] in s
scores ← SOA-SCORE(si, sj)





Finally, the change of ownership score is computed as the sum of each component score,
which results in a value that ranges between zero and three. This score should be computed
for each date that a passive DNS resolution was seen for a domain; these scores can then
be sorted from highest to lowest to provide a ranking of dates, and corresponding ranges,
which are most likely associated with changes in domain ownership.
The resulting list can be used to provide additional information about domains based on
their residual trust. For example, whitelists can be pruned so that benign sites undergoing an
ownership change can be quickly remapped to another appropriate category (e.g, “unknown”
or “untrusted”) depending on the context. Knowledge of ownership changes can be leveraged
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Figure 19: CDF showing the distance (in days) between an ownership change and the closest
observation in our passive DNS dataset. For 75% of the ownership changes, there is an
observation in the passive DNS dataset that is less than 20 days away.
4.4.3 Efficacy of Alembic
Using the Alembic algorithm and our passive DNS dataset, we compute the ownership
scores for a sample of active domains in DZ . In our analysis, we define a domain as active
if it was resolved at least W , with W = 14, times over any 120 day period in our dataset.
This requirement filters domains for which the lack of observations would yield unreliable
results. Similarly, we restrict our analysis to domains for which we were able to acquire
ground truth about ownership changes. In total, we calculated 764,681 ownership scores for
11,564 domain names.
We compared the scores against known ownership changes gathered from archives of
historically collected WHOIS data [29]: 17,838 changes in total. Figure 19 shows the
distance between actual date of change and the closest observation date in our dataset. In
short, 80% of the confirmed changes fall within 13 days of an observation in our dataset.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 20: Window timespan required for W observation days versus the distance between
date of change and closest observation. This figure shows the best Alembic can perform
given the sparse nature of the DNS resolutions for the domains in DZ .
resolutions for a domain. Specifically, Alembic requires at least W/2 observation days
before and after the candidate date. In other words, the span of the observation window
depends on the resolution frequency of the domain. At a minimum, the window may span
W consecutive days, i.e., the domain saw a DNS resolution on all W days. In the worst case,
the domain may only be resolved once over our dataset’s collection period. As mentioned
above, we cap the date range necessary to collect W days of resolution behavior at 120
days. We show the date range of the observation window with respect to the number of days
away from an exact match in Figure 20. In total, we find 4,543 (25.5%) of all changes fall
within an Alembic observation window. Encouragingly, the bulk of these ownership change
events occurred within ten days of an observation (red line in Figure 20)—even for larger
observation ranges.
We believe our algorithm is a necessary step towards fostering additional research into
domain ownership changes. Furthermore, our results show that Alembic, which works
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without relying on archiving and parsing WHOIS records, identifies potential changes in
ownership. We plan to improve and refine Alembic to account for multiple ownership
changes and sparsity in the input DNS data. For the latter, we propose investigation into
the relationship between the frequency of resolutions for a domain and the span of the
observation window required to detect ownership changes. Finally, we plan to explore other
detection signals to use as component scores.
4.4.4 Additional Discoveries Using Alembic
We used Alembic to help identify abuses of both positive and negative residual trust.
Here we discuss examples that fall into each of these categories. For the former, we
highlight previously benign domains which were later used for command and control
(C&C), leveraging the domain’s historic reputation to exploit whitelisting. For negative
residual trust, we highlight a potential attack vector whereby a leftover domain from a
state-sponsored threat could be used to trivially gain access to sensitive networks where an
infection has already occurred.
4.4.4.1 Abuse of Positive Residual Trust
Here we study cases where Alembic helped identify cases of positive residual trust abuse.
We present a brief look at two of the 263,847 domain names that were located by Alembic
and subsequently became malicious only after expiring.
First we look at doctorcompany.net. After expiration, malware began using this
domain for command and control (C&C). Anti-virus analysis from VirusTotal suggests this
particular malware was variant of Win32/Polif [15] (a.k.a. Symmi). This particular threat
is capable of numerous malicious activities including downloading and executing arbitrary
files, logging keystrokes and other sensitive data, and exfiltrating any stolen information.
Using available historic WHOIS data, we estimate that doctorcompany.net changed
owners once between 2008 and 2014. As shown in Table 14, the new owner chose to use
an identity protection service when registering the domain, a common tactic used to by
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Table 14: Ownership changes to doctorcompany.net
Date Reg. Name Reg. Email
10/15/08 Marcos Paulo dos Santos Fortunato marcos.fortunato@contato.net
02/07/13 Identity Protection Service doctorcompany.net
@identity-protect.org
both legitimate and malicious users to exclude personal information from WHOIS records.
Throughout the second lifetime of the domain and until its expiration—listed in the WHOIS
record as February 7, 2014—the domain used the same nameservers, suggesting the owner
remained the same during that year. We confirmed the domain became available for registra-
tion again on April 29, 2014—81 days after the listed expiry date and long enough to have
passed through the entire expiration process described in Section 2.1.3. About a month later
on May 25, 2014, we saw malicious binaries attempting to query this domain. Since this
domain had approximately six years of history without abuse, subsequent use by malware
benefited from the domain’s positive residual trust.
Similarly, clicky.info was also used for malware command and control (C&C)
only after domain expiration. AV analysis suggests this particular malware sample is a
variant of Win32/Nivdort [27], a trojan that steals key-presses, browsing history, credit
card information and user-names and passwords. Using historic WHOIS, the domain’s
ownership appears to have changed eight times over the course of eight years. A summary
appears in Table 15. Using historic WHOIS, we were able to confirm this domain was in
pending delete status on February 11, 2014, and we subsequently confirmed its expiration
on February 13, 2014 using the techniques mentioned in Section 4.3.1. As seen in Table 15,
it was subsequently seen re-registered on March 9, 2014. The first observed communication
by malware to this domain occurred on March 15, 2014—less than a week after being
re-registered. Consequently, malware using this domain is able to leverage almost eight
years of positive residual trust.
The WHOIS data for clicky.info shown in Table 15 also highlights that that
ownership changes are not always preceded by an expiration (domain registrations typically
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Table 15: Ownership changes to clicky.info
Date Reg. Name Reg. Email
03/16/06 Kim Fisher jadothebest@hotmail.com
03/23/07 Derek Giordano Derek@generalrate.com
01/01/09 Anders Oie anders oie@hotmail.com
04/05/10 Rubalier cvx.conts@gmail.com
10/20/10 barry harding bharding777@gmail.com
11/30/12 WANG SONGXU sdwildcat@163.com
11/26/13 del del del@del.del
03/09/14 Jeffrey Aikman Roldvale@aol.com
last at least one year). This further motivates the need for an algorithm like Alembic that
helps locate ownership changes and illustrates the need for better awareness around the
abuse of residual trust in domains.
4.4.4.2 Abuse of Negative Residual Trust
Next, we highlight a potential attack vector that leverages expired APT domains. On June 9,
2014 the security company CrowdStrike publicly released a report [14] detailing the cyber
espionage activity of PLA Unit 61486. Also known as PUTTER PANDA, Unit 61486 is
a branch of the Chinese SIGINT community.4 Their mission, according to CrowdStrike,
is to steal the trade secrets of corporations in the satellite, aerospace, and communication
industries.
CrowdStrike’s report identifies Chen Ping, as the primary persona responsible for
obtaining domains for Unit 61486’s C&C infrastructure. This moniker was derived from the
registrant email stored in the WHOIS records, cpyy.chen@gmail.com. We leveraged
this knowledge to identify usreports.net, an expired domain in our dataset that was
previously registered using Chen Ping’s email. We reanimated the domain, pointed it to a
sinkhole, and found that despite being expired for years (and Unit 61486’s activities being
publicized in high-profile white-papers) our sinkhole began receiving connection attempts,
every three seconds, from a national government research lab in Taiwan.
4Unit 61486 is distinct from Unit 61398 described in Mandiant’s APT1 report [10].
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It follows that any malicious party with knowledge of the C&C protocol can capitalize
on expired C&C domains to gain entry into already compromised networks—all for the
low price of domain registration. This raises an important question: Should domains be
available for re-registration after they were previously used for malicious purposes? We
discuss this issue more in the following section.
4.5 Discussion of Potential Remedies
Throughout this study, we have highlighted malicious re-registration and residual trust as
the root cause of many seemingly disparate security problems. In Section 4.2, we outlined
several attacks and security lapses made possible by the abuse of this residual trust. Current
solutions only address the symptoms of the underlying problem, not the cause, resulting in a
plethora of techniques that only address narrow avenues of abuse. Instead, these problems
would be better solved by addressing the underlying abuse vector.
In this section, we discuss potential remedies, both non-technical and technical, for
residual trust abuse. Unfortunately, there is no single solution that can completely solve the
problem; instead, a comprehensive remedy necessitates discussion and cooperation between
all affected stakeholders. Our analysis of remedies is intended to outline the challenging
nature of the problem with the hope it will foster further investigation by the security
community.
4.5.1 Non-Technical Remedies
While any domain may carry residual trust, the severity of potential abuse is much greater
for certain types of domains, e.g., those previously used by financial institutions or critical
infrastructure. In short, domains that affect large numbers of users and systems, if abused,
would benefit more from greater protections than other less important domains.
One potential remedy is to restrict critical industries to specially regulated zones. The
idea is to limit who can register expired domains from one of these protected zones. Indeed,
we already see this type of behavior with zones like gov and edu. Unfortunately, there
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are several unresolved questions and challenges with this solution. First, what criteria must
be met for a domain to be considered critical? Second, how do we identify the existing
critical domains? Third, assuming such domains could be identified, how do we migrate
each domain from its existing zone? Finally, who is responsible for creating and managing
the critical zones? These questions are made even more complicated by the global reach of
the Internet; many diverse organizations (with different goals and motivations) would need
to reach a consensus before any global solution could be adopted.
Rather than rely on custom zones, another potential option is to have the registrars or
registries enforce special registration policies for critical domains. This solution is attractive
as it could provide protection to critical domains under all zones and not simply those
under a special top-level domain. However, this requires identification and reporting of
all critical domains to either the registrars or registries and, for many organizations, this
could be a challenging task. It also does not solve the problem of which domains qualify for
protected registrations. This solution may be further complicated by the fact that any solution
involving the registrars or registries also presumes that they would be willing participants.
Given their financial interest in selling domains, there is a strong possibility that they would
be reticent to employ any policies that make domain registration more cumbersome.
The previous two solutions focus on identifying critical domains; however, such solutions
do not address the case where a non-critical domain is used as a trust anchor. For example,
in Section 4.2.2 we saw how email addresses for expired domains were used for account
management, thereby opening up the possibility for an attacker to hijack the account using
malicious re-registration. For these domains, non-technical remedies need to be augmented
with technical ones; we will discuss a couple such options in detail below.
4.5.2 Technical Remedies
When non-technical remedies fail, a technical solution is needed to mitigate problems. There
are innumerable services that rely on third party domains, either for infrastructure or from
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users, and it is unlikely that many of these domains would fit some strict definition of a
critical domain. As such, the non-technical policies proposed above would not be sufficient.
Instead, these systems should employ some process, such as Alembic (Section 4.4),
for identifying potential ownership changes. Such changes should be used to expire or
revise the inherent residual trust of the associated domains. For instance, systems that rely
on e-mail should re-evaluate access policies when e-mails expire or change ownership. A
firewall rule that whitelists a domain should be revised to reclassify domains in order to
avoid missing new attacks. A security information and event management (SIEM) device
that classifies a domain as “low risk/spam/click-fraud/SEO” may revise the scoring of
domains that have changed ownership. Given the active role of expired domains in APT
attacks, this recommendation applies equally to forensic analysts and those investigating
post-compromise events.
For smaller numbers of domains, it may be possible to use WHOIS to identify when
the residual trust of domains should be re-evaluated, but this will not scale due to the
complexities of bulk WHOIS collection. Furthermore, the lack of consistent formatting, use
of privacy protection services, and inconsistent verification of WHOIS data may cause infer-
ences relying on it to be unreliable. A system like Alembic could be used to address some
of those concerns. In particular, it could be used to help identify ownership changes when
scaling WHOIS becomes untenable, and since it relies on underlying network properties, it
may find ownership changes that would be missed in WHOIS due to unreliable or forged
data.
Dealing with residual trust is a challenging problem, but ignoring it exposes users and
systems to a host of security issues. A comprehensive solution for this problem will require
additional research and discussion by the security community.
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4.6 Summary
Domains can change ownership for many reasons (e.g., expirations, auction, transfers) and
the remaining residual trust is abused by clever attackers hoping to evade whitelists, hijack
accounts, exploit software systems, or even buy access to existing infections. In short, we
find that residual trust abuse is the root cause of many security issues on the Internet. At
its core, there are potential policy and technical remedies. Policy remedies could identify
potential avenues for exploiting residual domain trust and prevent or police re-registrations
as appropriate. When that fails, technical remedies should actively try to identify ownership
changes; we propose one such algorithm, Alembic.
Using a dataset of 179,326,265 expired domains spanning from December 2008 to July
2015, we quantify and characterize residual trust abuse and malicious re-registration. We
found that 385,741 expired domains were contacted by malware or appeared on a public
blacklist. This intersection contained almost a third, 101,322 (31.7%), of public blacklists
domains in our dataset, and more troubling, a little over quarter, 27,758 (27.4%), of these
domains expired before being blacklisted. In addition, only 3,327 (1.4%) domains contacted
by malware after expiration ever appeared on a public blacklist. These findings demonstrate
that the residual trust of expiring domains is being actively exploited. To make matters
worse, we observe that the number of domains showing up on blacklists after expiration has
grown from 784 between 2009 and 2012 to over 9,000 domains in 2014 alone; this shows
that residual trust abuse is a growing phenomenon.
In order to help the research community flag potentially dangerous reanimated domain
names, we developed a lightweight algorithm to rank potential domain ownership changes
using only features that can be passively collected from DNS. We used this algorithm to
identify several cases of residual trust abuse; specifically, we identified instances where
re-registered domain names were used as infrastructure to facilitate attacks and one instance
where an expired APT-related domain name could have been re-registered to gain access to
an overseas government research lab.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL MALWARE
5.1 Motivation
Malware analysis is at the forefront of the fight against Internet threats. Over the last decade,
numerous systems have been proposed to statically and dynamically analyze malicious
software and produce detailed behavioral reports [169, 244]. The vast amounts of data
collected by such systems can be used to provide important reputation information about
both IP and domain name system (DNS) infrastructure, which play an important role in the
state-of-the-art detection engines used by the security industry.
Despite the fact that an increasing number of companies and researchers now have
access to large malware databases—often containing millions of samples—little is known
about how the infrastructure and methods used by Internet miscreants has evolved over time.
Previous studies [105, 171, 173, 216, 248, 251] often used small datasets and performed very
specific analysis—focusing on topics like the role of cloud providers, the infrastructure
behind drive-by downloads, or the domains used by few malware families.
To shed light on this important problem, we performed a five year, longitudinal study of
dynamic analysis traces collected from multiple (i.e., two commercial and one academic)
malware feeds. These feeds contain network information extracted from the execution of
more than 26.8 million unique malware samples. We complement this dataset with over five
billion DNS queries collected from a large North American internet service provider (ISP).
The combination of these two sources provides a unique view into the network infrastructure
that malware samples have contacted over the past five years.
There are three main differentiators between this work and all the previous work that we
build upon. First, we analyze several orders of magnitude more data than any prior research
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efforts, and we do so over a much longer observation period—almost five full years. This
affords us unique insights into how tens of millions of malware samples have evolved over
time. Next, we link network level communications (e.g., domains and IPs) with system
oriented information (e.g., malware families, PUP). Most existing work does not attempt to
perform both these types of analysis in concert—let alone at this scale. Finally, we provide
temporal analysis of malware communication over time. This gives us interesting insight
into the relationship between the first observable network communication and discovery of
malware by the community.
It is only fair to acknowledge that our work was possible because of the many prior
efforts in the fields of malware and network analysis—the most notable of which we cite.
The fact that our findings confirm the results of many past studies lends further weight to
their results and serves to make them more generalizable. We believe the community needs
a combination of both large-scale longitudinal studies and more focused small-scale studies.
The former better captures global phenomena and general trends while the latter enables
more detailed investigations by allowing for manual analysis and deeper inspection of traffic.
5.1.1 Contributions
Our study resulted in four different contributions that we will discuss in greater detail below.
First, while dynamic analysis traces can be used as ground truth and forensic evidence
of an infection, they should be very carefully curated. Conducting our long term analysis
required us to devise a comprehensive filtering process to remove benign domains from our
datasets. This process emphasizes the challenges of reducing the inevitable noise present in
any large dataset. We provide (Section 5.3) a detailed and extensive set of rules that network
defenders should follow when they wish to remove potentially benign domain names from
their dynamic analysis traces.
Next, we observe that PUPs are not only on the rise (Section 5.4) but also that they
surprisingly utilize a very stable network IP infrastructure. Our analysis shows that PUP
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families host their infrastructure on popular cloud hosting providers and CDNs for up to
several years. This may indicate that popular hosting providers do not have the same abuse
policies towards banning PUPs that they use to fight malware. This analysis required us
to modify an existing clustering tool [203] and perform the largest malware classification
effort to date.
Third, dynamic malware analysis traces are far from the ideal source of information
for building early warning systems or detecting new emerging threats. In our analysis,
we see that domain names used in malware communications are active weeks, sometimes
even months, before malware gets discovered and analyzed by the security community
(Section 5.5.2.2). This observation has a direct implication on malware domain name
blacklists (Section 5.5.1.1). While they are certainly useful for detecting current and past
malware families, they are not necessarily an efficient method of combating future malware
threats. In fact, our long term study shows (Figure 26) that malicious domains were added
to major blacklists several days after the malware appeared in one of our feeds and months
after the potentially malicious communication was seen in passive DNS.
Lastly, we study the evolution of the IP infrastructure resolved by malware and PUP
domains over time, and we identify three interesting categories of “hot spots” in the IP
space. These categories correspond to (1) IPs associated with large families that use the
same network for extended periods of time, suggesting significant deficiencies in current
network and system level defenses; (2) IPs associated with sinkhole operations run by
security organizations; and (3) IPs associated with hosting providers that are more willing
to tolerate malicious infrastructures, resulting in frequent use by several families. We also
analyze the roles of dynamic DNS (DDNS) and content delivery network (CDN) services, as
they are both frequently used by malware, and show that approximately 32% of all malware
samples in our dataset queried at least one dynamic DNS domain. Finally, we measure
the prevalence of domains created by domain generation algorithms (DGAs) in network
communication from malware samples, and we find that at least 44% of the domains from
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Table 16: Summary of datasets used. All datasets correspond to January 2011–August 2015.
Dataset Data Count




VirusTotal Reports 23.9 M




Public Blacklists Distinct Blacklists 8
e2LDs 320 K
Alexa e2LDs 8 M
Expired Domains e2LDs 179 M
DGArchive [31] DGA FQDNs 50 M
dynamic malware traces are generated by 42 DGA families
5.2 Datasets
Table 16 summarizes the datasets used in this work. All data corresponds to the time period
from January 1st 2011 to August 31st 2015 unless otherwise noted. We use three malware
executions datasets to obtain the domains resolved by malware and the IP addresses they
resolved to; a passive DNS dataset to map domains to IP addresses and obtain an estimation
of their query volume; VirusTotal (VT) reports to obtain additional metadata for the executed
malware; public blacklists to identify dates when malicious domains were blocked; the
historical Alexa top 1M for whitelisting benign domains; domain expiration dates to mark
end of ownership events; and the DGArchive [31] to identify DGA domains. Each of these
datasets is described in more detail below.
In this paper, we focus on effective second level domains (e2LDs) rather than fully quali-
fied domains names (FQDNs) because e2LDs better capture domain ownership. For example,
the FQDN www.google.com has e2LD google.com, while www.amazon.co.uk
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Table 17: Summary of the public blacklists used in this study.
Blacklist Target Source
Abuse.ch Malware, C&C. [18]
Malware DL Malware. [26]
Blackhole DNS Malware, Spyware. [19]
sagadc Malware, Fraud, SPAM. [23]
hphosts Malware, Fraud, Ad tracking. [21]
SANS Aggregate list. [24]
itmate Malicious Webpages. [22]
driveby Drive-by downloads. [20]
has e2LD amazon.co.uk, since the second level domain co.uk does not correspond to
the domain owner. Thus, unless otherwise noted, when we talk about domains we refer to
e2LDs and only use FQDNs for better differentiation when needed.
Malware Executions. We collected all the domain names resolved by malware samples
from three different datasets—each containing the MD5 of the malware, date of execution
in the sandbox, domain names resolved during the execution, and IP addresses that domains
resolved to. Each malware sample ran for no more than five minutes in each of the different
datasets.
We briefly describe the three datasets but will only refer to their union, after removing
duplicate samples, throughout the rest of the paper .
• UNIV ERSITY . This dataset comes from a university-operated malware execution
environment. Collected from January 2011 to August 2015.
• V ENDOR. This dataset comes from the malware execution environment of a large
security vendor that tracks spam and e-mail abuse. Collected from September 2014 to
August 2015.
• ANUBIS. This dataset comes from the Anubis Web service [146], where users can
upload suspicious samples for dynamic analysis. Anubis has operated since 2007, but
we focus on executions between January 2011 and June 2014.
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In total, we collected the network behavior of 26.8M unique malware samples. It is
important to note that this number excludes samples without any valid or successful DNS
resolutions.
VirusTotal Reports (V T ). VirusTotal [37] is an online service that analyzes files and URLs
submitted by users. Submitted executables are scanned with multiple AV engines. VT offers
an API to query meta-data on malware samples using a sample’s hash, and we queried VT
using the 26.8M hashes. For each sample, we collected the time it was first observed by V T ,
AV analysis date, and AV detection labels. Of the 26.8M samples, 89% were known to VT
at the time of our submission (i.e., during the period 2015-16).
Passive DNS (pDNS). Due to agreements with the provider of this data, we cannot
publicly disclose the exact source, but we can state that this dataset contains passive DNS
data collected from a large ISP in the United States. It contains the domain names resolved
by clients of the ISP and the IP addresses those domains resolved to. This data was collected
above the recursive DNS server, and therefore, it does not contain information about the
clients making requests—rather it aggregates resolutions from all clients. In particular, the
dataset contains resource records (i.e., timestamp, queried domain name, and associated
RDATA [164, 165]), as well as domain lookup volumes aggregated on a daily basis. It
comprises 2.9M e2LDs resolving to 178.7M IP addresses.
Public Blacklists (PBL). This dataset contains 320K malicious e2LD entries extracted and
aggregated from the eight public domain blacklists, detailed in Table 17, which we regularly
collected and updated for the entire duration of the project. Due to this aggregation, the
dataset includes multiple types of abusive domains such as drive-by downloads, phishing,
and botnet C&C. These domains are curated by members of the security community and,
thus, represent cases of human verified abuse. For each domain, the data also provides the
exact date when the domain was included in the blacklist.
Alexa. This dataset contains rankings of the Alexa top million domains collected daily [40].
It contains approximately 8M unique e2LDs across our entire analysis period.
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Expired Domains. This dataset includes the expiration dates of 179M (benign and mali-
cious) e2LDs for the past seven years. These expirations were verified by recording removals
from successive gTLD zone transfers and, since the removal alone does not always indicate
an expiration, were further vetted using the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) with a
domain reseller account. This methodology is modeled off of previous work that studied
potential pitfalls resulting from domain ownership changes [153].
DGArchive. Plohmann et al. [182] recently reverse-engineered malware families that use
a DGA. The results of their work is collected in the DGArchive [31], a database of 50M
domains that can be generated by the DGAs of 66 malware families. We use the DGArchive
to identify DGA domains among the domains resolved in the malware executions.
Limitations and Potential Biases. Despite our best efforts to collect the most comprehen-
sive set of data sources to perform our study, there are still some limitations and potential
biases worth mentioning. For example, our study cannot cover samples that have failed to
run or that used evasion techniques to avoid revealing their network behavior in the analysis
sandbox. To ameliorate this issue, we combine three different malware feeds each using
their own sandbox environment. Our datasets also have some geographical bias towards the
United States, since the passive DNS data was collected from a large US ISP. However, we
believe some form of bias is unavoidable in this type of study. Compared to the state of the
art in DNS and malware analysis, our datasets still provide the broadest and deepest view on
malware network behavior to date by far.
5.3 Domain Filtering
We start our analysis by processing the DNS requests performed by malicious files run
in dynamic analysis sandboxes. For this, we first remove 255,747 samples that were not
flagged as malicious by any AV vendor (according to the results collected in our VirusTotal
dataset). What was left was a set of likely malicious or unwanted files.
Since malware does not interact with exclusively malicious infrastructure, not all domains
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queried by malware samples can be considered malicious. In fact, as it is often the case
with large datasets, the initial set of DNS requests was very noisy and needed to be carefully
pre-processed to remove all spurious and unwanted entries. In our study, we want to focus
on domains that are associated with actual malicious communication. However, despite the
fact that all domains are requested by malicious files, the vast majority of the requests in
our dataset did not fall in this category. While this may seem surprising at first, it is the
consequence of several factors—such as the presence of non-existent domains generated by
domain generation algorithms (DGAs), connectivity tests to benign domains, sinkholes, and
spam-related activity.
To remove this noise, we proceeded with an initial filtering phase divided into four
separate steps with the goal of eliminating invalid, benign, or sinkholed domains as well as
reverse delegation queries.
Invalid Domains. Since not all DNS requests result in a valid resolution, we first filter out
DNS queries that request non-existent domains (i.e., that do not return a valid IP address).
This step is particularly important to reduce the impact of domain generation algorithms
(DGAs), where malware tries to resolve many possible domains until it finds one that has
been registered by the botmaster. We study the resolutions for non-existent domains, which
may be subsequently registered and used for abuse, and DGA behavior in Section 5.7.
Overall, this first filtering step successfully reduced the number of unique effective
second level domains from 6,850,793 to 1,316,331 , and the number of fully qualified
domain names from 11,532,653 to 3,767,234 .
Benign Domains. The hardest part of domain filtering consists of identifying and removing
the queries performed towards benign domains. Their presence is due to many factors that
include malware using legitimate services (e.g., Dropbox), testing if the infected machine
has a working Internet connection, downloading components from compromised websites,
delivering spam messages to victim mail servers, and even querying an existing benign
domain as a result of collisions in a poorly designed DGA algorithm.
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The variety of potential causes makes it very difficult to automatically filter out all
benign DNS requests. Our approach relies on three separate steps. In the first, we use
the ALEXA dataset to remove domains that appeared in the Alexa top ten thousand most
popular domains for at least a year, with the exception of dynamic DNS domains—which are
often abused for malicious purposes. While the ALEXA dataset provides a good starting
point, it fails to capture some obviously popular domains. Therefore, in the second step we
manually sifted through the most popular domains remaining after the Alexa filtering, and
we identified and removed from our dataset other popular sites such as content distribution
networks. This step reduced the set of effective second level domains from 1,316,331 to
1,291,313 and fully qualified domain names from 3,767,234 to 3,295,860.
Finally, we noticed that the remaining dataset was largely dominated by spam bots,
which query hundreds or even thousands of benign domains with the goal of locating the
SMTP servers of their targets. A comprehensive study of spam behavior is outside the scope
of this study. Therefore, we used an aggressive filter that removed any samples performing
MX lookups and, as some malware may receive a pre-generated list of MX records, samples
that queried for domains containing mail-related keywords (e.g., mail, smtp, imap). While
excluding entire samples matching this filter may seem aggressive, we observed that only
405,742 (1.5%) distinct samples contained at least one MX or mail related domain. The
presence of these domains suggests a different type of behavior from the rest of the samples
in our dataset, and therefore, we chose to discard them to avoid missing less popular, benign
domains they may have queried.
In total, their removal reduced the set of effective second level domains from 1,291,313
to 329,348 and fully qualified domain names from 3,295,860 to 2,154,609.
Reverse Delegation Zones. DNS Pointer Records (PTR) often reflect activity from system
processes (e.g., gethostbyname()) trying to resolve IP addresses in a remote network. This
can occur when a program directly connects to an IP address without performing a DNS
resolution of a service’s domain name. For example, Windows logging makes note of a
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network socket connection but avoids listing the IP address—generating a DNS PTR record
instead. This behavior, associated with Windows logging of RFC 1918 [170] host names,
can be observed at the root levels of DNS [63]. Thus, dynamic execution of a malware may
generate reverse delegation domain names that point to remote residential IP space. While
the IP could be malicious, the reverse delegation domain name and its effective second
level domain cannot be considered malicious as they are typically owned by the ISP (e.g.,
Verizon) or the hosting provider (e.g., Rackspace).
While it may seem reasonable to remove all e2LD domains seen in PTR records, this
would result in too coarse of a filter because the owner of the netblock has the power to
assign any domain as the reverse DNS pointer. Thus, some PTR domains will contain the
actual domain name used to resolve an IP address instead of a domain, created by the ISP or
hosting provider, to describe the underlying infrastructure.
In our final step, we remove benign PTR domain names from our malware domain dataset
by excluding zones used by large ISPs and hosting providers for reverse DNS delegation [53].
In simple terms, reverse DNS is the domain name that an Internet provider has delegated to
an IP address. For example, for the IP address 173.53.80.48 the Internet provider has as-
signed the following reverse DNS delegation: static-173-53-80-48.rcmdva.fios.verizon.net.
This domain name can be retrieved by asking the PTR DNS record of the original IP.
Since malware execution may result in DNS PTR records to be created, we want to
exclude the most frequently witnessed e2LDs in such reverse delegation. Therefore, we
obtained a PTR scan of of all IPv4 from the Internet Systems Consortium (ISC), and we
broke down all the e2LDs in this datasets according to the number of /24 and /16 network
that can be seen. Our assumption here is that if the same e2LDs can be seen in several /16
and /24 networks, it must reflect a reverse DNS allocation conducted by an ISP or a hosting
provider. We decide to pick the top 1% of the e2LDs for both /16 and /24 networks in our
datasets, which reflects e2LDs that have been seen in more than ten /24 and /16 networks at








































Figure 21: Number of malware samples, qnames, e2LDs, and IPs according to the execution
time of the samples.
domains that are very likely associated with ISP or hosting networks. We use this list as the
final filter, reducing the set of effective second level domains to 327,514 and 2,085,484 fully
qualified domains.
Filtering Summary. The domain filtering phase reduced the initial candidate set of domains
queried by malicious samples by over 95%. However, despite the significant reduction in
e2LDs, 20M malware samples remain after filtering with at least one valid resolution.
Overall, this filtering was a very challenging and time-consuming process and the final
result, as we will discuss later in the paper, still likely contains some benign domains with
low popularity. However, we believe that our effort emphasizes two very important problems.
First, the vast majority of DNS queries performed by malware are not malicious per se –
and this may have a large impact on those approaches that populate domain blacklists based
on the results of dynamic analysis sandboxes. Second, performing studies on very large
datasets requires long periods—months in the case of this work—of manual work to tune
filters and properly remove unwanted noise.
The final distribution of samples and domains over the four years of our dataset is
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Figure 22: Malware and PUP samples over time. The drop in 2014 is due to a downtime of
our largest feed of malware executions.
summarized in Figure 21. The drop in the second half of 2014 reflects a failure in our
collection infrastructure for the largest feed of malware executions.
5.4 Classification
We perform 3 classifications on our dataset: grouping samples into families, classifying
families as either malware or PUP, and assigning e2LDs to specific families.
Sample classification. We cluster and label all samples into known families using the AV
labels in VirusTotal reports. While AV labels are known to be noisy [55, 166], we leverage
AVClass [203], a recently released open-source tool for massive malware labeling. AVClass
successfully removes noise from AV labels by addressing label normalization, generic token
detection, and alias detection. The tool achieves F1 measures between 0.94 and 0.70 and it
can process extremely large sets of VT reports—each containing AV scans of one sample by
multiple AV engines. AVClass outputs for each sample the most likely family name and a
confidence factor based on the agreement across engines.
PUP/Malware family classification. In addition to the family, AVClass also outputs for
each sample whether it is PUP or malware by examining PUP-related keywords in the AV
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labels. However, that classification is conservative as AV vendors often do not flag PUP
samples as such. Thus, some samples in a family may be flagged as PUP and other samples
in the same family as malware. To address this issue we have modified AVClass to output
a classification for each family as PUP or malware, so that all samples in the family can
be considered of the same class. Our modification counts for each family the number of
samples flagged as malware and PUP. Then, it applies a plurality vote on the samples of a
family to determine if the family is PUP or malware. We have contributed this modification
to AVClass to be integrated in the tool.
We use our modified AVClass to automatically cluster and label 23.9M samples for which
we have a VT report. As a comparison, the previous largest malware clustering/classification
effort in the literature was the AVClass evaluation with 8.9 M samples [203]. Figure 22
shows the number of malware and PUP samples over time. The figure shows an increase of
PUP samples over time, with PUP overtaking traditional malware since 2014. Kotzias et
al. [142] observed the same trend but on a dataset two orders of magnitude smaller and from
a single source, for which they could not discard source bias. Other work has also hinted on
the prevalence of PUP. Thomas et al. [220] showed that ad-injectors affect 5% of unique
daily IP addresses accessing Google. They also measured that Google’s Safe Browsing
generates three times as many detections for PUP as for malware [222].
AVClass identifies 17.7 K non-singleton families. Table 18 presents the top 10 families,
which comprise 49% of the samples and are largely dominated by PUP. The largest malware
families are vobfus (a Visual Basic worm [162]) and virut (a virus that appends its
payload to other executable files [213]). Both families have self-replicating behavior that in-
creases their polymorphism. The PUP families include adware that modifies advertisements
or searches in the browser (multiplug, loadmoney, hotbar) [220] and a number of
pay-per-install (PPI) programs (softpulse, installerex, firseria, outbrowse,
installcore) [141, 222].
The 3,834 families with more than 10 samples comprise over 90% of all samples. Of
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Table 18: Top 10 malware families by number of samples in our dataset. The FSeen column
contains the first seen date of a family by VirusTotal.
Rank Family Samples Type e2LDs FSeen
1 vobfus 2.8 M Malware 741 11/09
2 multiplug 2.4 M PUP 808 01/13
3 loadmoney 1.6 M PUP 2,958 12/12
4 virut 1.4 M Malware 40,705 03/08
5 softpulse 1.3 M PUP 3,793 06/14
6 hotbar 1.1 M PUP 306 08/10
7 installerex 847 K PUP 155 12/11
8 firseria 795 K PUP 3,138 07/12
9 outbrowse 771 K PUP 52 04/13
10 installcore 661 K PUP 1,118 09/11
Top 10 49% - 15% -
those families, 3,165 are malware and 669 PUP. While there are more malware families, the
PUP families are larger with an average of 16 K samples per family compared to 3.5 K for
malware families. This illustrates the highly polymorphic nature of PUP, which is not due to
self-replication, but likely due to evasion of AV engines [142].
e2LD classification. We create a mapping from e2LD to the most likely family the e2LD
belongs to. For this, we first create a mapping from e2LD to the number of samples of each
family that have resolved that e2LD. Then, for e2LDs that have been resolved by at least 10
samples, we assign each e2LD to the family with most samples resolving it. e2LDs with
less than 10 samples resolving them are left unclassified.
Table 19 presents the top 10 families ranked by the number of resolved e2LDs. Compared
to the ranking by samples, this ranking is dominated by malware (8/10 families), which may
indicate that PUP families have a more stable domain infrastructure and malware uses higher
levels of domain polymorphism. The e2LDs from these 10 families correspond to 31% of all
filtered e2LDs and Virut alone is responsible for 12% of them. Virut’s domain infrastructure
comprises a few dozens stable domains in the .com and .pl (Poland) TLDs, as well as a
DGA. We study DGAs in Section 5.7. The popular zbot/zeus botnet is ranked third in
Table 19, likely due to many different operators using the botkit.
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Table 19: Top 10 malware families by number of filtered e2LDs that resolved to a valid IP
address. The FSeen column contains the first seen date of a family by VirusTotal.
Rank Family e2LDs Type Samples FSeen
1 virut 40,705 Malware 1.4 M 03/08
2 rodecap 17,382 Malware 11.8 K 05/09
3 zbot 12,959 Malware 163 K 01/08
4 tedroo 6,272 Malware 5 K 11/08
5 sality 4,964 Malware 463 K 12/08
6 upatre 4,658 Malware 503 K 09/13
7 fareit 4,217 Malware 61 K 10/11
8 softpulse 3,793 PUP 1.3 M 06/14
9 ircbot 3,635 Malware 28.5 K 05/06
10 firseria 3,138 PUP 795 K 07/12
Top 10 31% - 17% -
By combining the e2LD to family mapping and the family to PUP/malware mapping,
we can mark e2LDs as belonging to malware or PUP. This classification identifies 36.5 K
malware and 9.1 K PUP e2LDs. The remaining e2LDs are left unclassified due to less than
10 samples resolving them. This classification enables to study separately and compare
properties of the PUP and malware network infrastructure (Section 5.5.2).
5.5 Malware Domain Analysis
Malware often engages in various network communications in an attempt to exfiltrate data,
communicate with a command and control (C&C) server, or download additional illicit
software. This communication often relies on DNS rather than static IP addresses to provide
resiliency against IP blacklisting and ensure an overall agility for the malicious operation.
Therefore, we study the domains queried by malware to better understand the temporal
DNS properties of their network communications. In Section 5.5.1, we evaluate domain
names queried by malware during dynamic malware analysis. Our experiments show that
malware frequently uses domain polymorphism that significantly limits the network policy
and detection abilities of DNS blacklists. Then, in Section 5.5.2, we correlate those domain
names with a large passive DNS dataset to identify whether we first collect the malware
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Figure 23: Shows histograms of MD5 network traces broken down by various components.
sample or observe passive DNS activity for malware domains on the network. We find that
a significant percentage of malware domains can be seen in passive DNS several weeks, in
many cases even months, before the actual malware sample was dynamically analyzed by
the security community.
5.5.1 Dynamic Malware Analysis
We start by analyzing domains collected from dynamic malware analysis. As noted in
Section 5.2, we have a dataset of 26,853,732 malware samples collected since January 2011.
From these samples, we collected 11,532,653 fully qualified domain names under 6,850,793
distinct effective second level domains. After extensive filtering, detailed in Section 5.3, we
reduced this to 2,085,484 fully qualified domain names under 327,514 effective second level
domains. In the following sections we study various properties of this set of domains.
5.5.1.1 Domain Polymorphism
Once a sample has been analyzed, the domain names used to facilitate malicious commu-
nication can be added to a DNS blacklist. Obviously, the effectiveness of these blacklists





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 24: Top 100 most popular Dynamic DNS domains queried by malware samples.
The analysis of domains resolved by samples in our dataset shows that most malware
samples appear to use different domains over time, as shown in Figure 23. In particular,
Figure 23a shows that most MD5s resolve less than 10 unique e2LDs. Even more interesting,
most of these e2LDs were seen only a single time across our five year collection period
(Figure 23d), which means that they were only queried by a single malware sample. This
is an interesting result because it suggests that most domains are used only once by a
single malware sample in our dataset. If the domain is embedded in the binary and not
downloaded from an external source, this can also cause samples in the same family to
have different MD5s, even in absence of other polymorphism techniques. Furthermore,
Figure 23b suggests that network evasion is being done predominantly on the e2LD since
the majority of e2LDs have few child FQDNs. Further reinforcing this result, Figure 23e
shows that FQDNs share an almost identical distribution to e2LDs.
These results suggest that blacklisting malware domains observed during dynamic
analysis does little to prevent future communication from newly discovered malware samples.
This result does not diminish the usefulness of collecting malware samples or performing
malware analysis, but simply underline the limitation and reactive nature of relying on
malware samples DNS queries for threat mitigation.
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5.5.1.2 Dynamic DNS
Dynamic DNS allows nameservers to be automatically updated with frequently changing
information. For example, users with dynamically assigned IP addresses commonly use
dynamic DNS as a way of accessing their devices through an easy to remember domain
name, which is updated as their IP address changes. There are numerous publicly available
services that provide this functionality (e.g., [33,35]), and many of these services allow users
to select a subdomain under a domain owned by the dynamic DNS provider, eliminating the
need for the user to register a new domain name.
Due to its ability to provide rapid updates, dynamic DNS is also abused by malware
authors to point domains at C&C servers or infected hosts. Furthermore, by using a domain
provided by the dynamic DNS provider, the abuse cannot be blocked at the zone level
without also blocking other legitimate users of the service. In fact, this has caused significant
problems for past remediation efforts [13]. Additionally, Previous work [109] has shown
that dynamic DNS domains are blocked at a higher rate (0.2%) than for all other web traffic
(0.001%) as measured by data collected from Cisco Cloud Web Security (CWS). This
suggests that there is a higher incidence of abuse for dynamic DNS domains. Unfortunately,
no information was given about the scope or observation period of the data used to arrive
at these numbers. In Section 5.5.1.2, we used our dataset spanning five years and 26.8M
malware samples to perform a similar analysis. While we arrived at a similar conclusion that
malware frequently makes use of dynamic DNS, our list of most frequently used dynamic
DNS domains differed substantially this previous work. Since the popular dynamic DNS
domains referenced in the previous work were a subset of those used in our study, this may
indicate that the popularity of dynamic DNS domains for abuse varies over time.
Therefore, we decided to analyze which dynamic DNS providers are most frequently
used by malware. In total, we found 718 known dynamic DNS e2LDs in our dataset from
a list of dynamic DNS domains gathered from two public sources [32, 34]. Figure 24










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 25: Complete list of all known CDN domains queried by malware samples.
most popular dynamic DNS domain, dnsd.me (owned by the dynamic DNS provider
DNSdynamic [1]), was queried by 216,221 unique MD5s . This service is not only free,
but it also offers unlimited registrations and an API for account management—making it
very attractive for malware authors. Including dnsd.me, the top 50 dynamic DNS domains
each have at least a thousand distinct malware samples that query them, and on average each
of those domains has approximately 366 subdomains under it. In fact, we see that these
top dynamic DNS domains account for 19,766 FQDNs. When looking at all 718 dynamic
DNS domains, we see that they are queried by 8,675,449 distinct malware samples, which
represents approximately 32% of all malware samples with DNS queries. Furthermore, these
718 domains account for 51,350 FQDNs. Thus, unlike most of the domains we discussed in
Section 5.5.1.1, dynamic DNS domains are commonly used across many malware samples
and evasion is performed on the child label of the domain.
5.5.1.3 Content Delivery Networks
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) are frequently used to serve content from multiple,
geographically distributed, data centers to provide increased performance and availability.
By taking the client location into account, CDN providers are able to serve up content
from the nearest data center, improving network performance. Most providers are still able
to offer performance benefits even when location information is unavailable due to faster
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connections and high-end data centers. Additionally, serving content from multiple data
centers helps obviate content outages by providing network redundancy. It is no surprise,
given their benefits, that CDNs are widely used on the Internet.
In this section, we study how malware uses CDNs by studying domains collected from
dynamic malware analysis. Figure 25 shows a plot of all CDN domains, sorted by how
many unique malware samples queried them in our dataset. The first notable feature of
this plot is the discrepancy between the most and least popular CDNs. The top five most
queried CDN domains include akamai.net, edgesuite.net, cloudfront.net,
netdna-cdn.com, and akadns.net. This list includes some of the largest CDNs
and is not dissimilar from what a benign network application might be seen querying.
Another interesting insight from Figure 25 is the number of malware samples using CDNs.
The akamai.net domain alone is queried by 2,183,352 distinct malware samples and
has 1,492 unique child labels under it. The large number of child labels combined with
potentially benign usage allows malicious content hosted in a CDN to effectively hide in
plain site.
5.5.2 Passive DNS and Blacklists Analysis
In the previous sections, we analyzed the domains collected from network traces observed
during dynamic analysis. In this section, we correlate these domains with three other data
sources: (1) a passive DNS dataset provided by a large ISP in the United States, (2) a number
of public DNS based blacklists, and (3) a set of domain expiration events. This allows us to
study the lag between when a domain is discovered through dynamic malware analysis, or
listed on a blacklist, and when it is first resolved in passive DNS. This allows us to better
understand the implications of relying on dynamic malware analysis of public blacklists for
early detection systems.
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Figure 26: Time difference between when a domain was first seen in passive DNS, public
blacklists, or an expired domain list rather than through dynamic malware analysis.











































































Figure 27: Joint distribution of domain lifetime and resolution frequency observed in passive
DNS for PUP, Malware, and Unclassified domains.
5.5.2.1 First Appearance
We start our analysis by evaluating efficacy of public blacklists at identifying malware
domains. This provides an interesting perspective because domains on these lists have
already been flagged as abusive by manual experts or dedicated services. The result of
this analysis is plotted in Figure 26a, separated by the type of sample. As we explained in
Section 5.4, we classify domains in our malware analysis traces as belonging to a malware
family, PUP, or an unclassified category—which comprises e2LDs resolved by less than
10 samples. This separation allow us to provide insights into potential differences between
these three classes of malicious software.
The figure shows that many domains were added to public blacklists only after we
observed them in dynamic malware analysis traces. In particular, only 30% of the entries
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were added to blacklists before the domain was observed in our dynamic analysis dataset,
while 20% of them were reported with a delay of over 500 days. This result suggests that
such delays could be largely reduced by relying on malware analysis to populate domains
blacklists—possibly after applying a cleaning methodology like the one we described
in Section 5.3. While it may seem reasonable to attribute this delay to the selection of
blacklists used in this study, this result is consistent with previous work by Kührer et al [143]
where domains were seen in passive DNS on average 384 days before appearing on a
blacklist. Therefore, it is unlikely that the addition of other blacklists would profoundly
affect this result. Additionally, reputation systems [43, 62] that rely on passive DNS have
also demonstrated the ability to identify new threats more quickly than public blacklists.
Furthermore, the observed delay between appearing in passive DNS and on public blacklists
also lends credence to the idea of proactively detecting and blocking abuse at the time of
domain registration as proposed by Hao et al. [113].
Next, we compare the date when we first observed a malware domain resolve in passive
DNS with the date when the same domain was first observed in a dynamic malware analysis
trace. By computing the difference between these two dates, we can determine how quickly
new malware threats are discovered and analyzed by the security community. Figure 26b
shows whether a malware domain was first seen in passive DNS or in a network trace derived
by the dynamic analysis of a malware sample. Points less than zero on the x-axis indicate
that a domain was first seen in passive DNS, and points greater than zero mean that the
malware discovery occurred before the first observed network resolution in passive DNS.
The figure shows that the PUP-related domains are active an average of 192 days before
we get to dynamically analyze the corresponding samples. This may be expected, as PUP
relies on infrastructure that is more stable and long-running. However, we can see that
popular malware families also follow a similar but less extreme pattern. This result is
more surprising because for most of these domains the difference is very significant—with
discovery delays reaching 623 days on average. Lastly, the domain names associated with
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the unclassified category follow the most interesting distribution. While many appear first in
the passive DNS traces (left side of the Figure 26b), this category completely dominates the
right tail of the graph—representing domains that were seen in passive DNS only months
after we observed them in our sandboxes.
Overall, by combining the three classes together, we discovered that 302,953 malware
domains were active at least two weeks—in some cases many months—before the corre-
sponding malware samples were analyzed. Therefore, while we previously showed that
dynamic analysis systems could be used to improve current blacklists, our results also show
that blacklists built from dynamic malware analysis will still be unaware of potential threats
for several weeks or even months.
The surprising nature of this result prompted us to perform additional analysis. Thus,
we used our dataset of historic domain expirations to verify that a given domain was not
used in the wild before expiring and being re-registered for malicious purposes. Figure 26c
shows a similar pattern as the one in Figure 26a. The large peak around zero is likely a result
of changes made to the domain infrastructure for unpopular or unused expiring domains.
Such changes would likely result in DNS traffic to a parked or suspended page during the
registrar’s expiration grace period. Despite our extensive filtering efforts, the left tail in the
graph remains significant. This can be partially explained by malware relying on benign
infrastructure, such as dynamic DNS and CDN providers already mentioned in Section 5.5.1.
Another possible explanation is that the long tail is an artifact of a long setup phase for
malware before it is released into the wild. During this phase, malware authors may age the
domain and point it to benign infrastructure to build up positive reputation to help evade
detection later. However, in the case of expired domains, this step is unnecessary because
the domain will inherit the residual trust associated with the domain [153]—eliminating
the need for a long aging phase. As shown in Figure 26c, we still see a long delay between
last expiration of a domain and first discovery of an associated malware sample. Thus,
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one explanation could be that there is a long delay between a domain expiration and re-
registration. In fact, this very behavior was seen in a study of spam related domain names by
Hao et al. [114]. Their research showed that many registrations came hundreds of days after
expiration, but abuse was observed less than three months after re-registration in most cases.
Since we removed spam related malware samples in our extensive filtering step, this could
suggest that the same behavior employed by spammers may also be used by other malware
authors. However, it is also possible that domains are registered quickly after expiration and
immediately used for abuse. Another potential explanation may be that our feeds are not
the first to see new samples. However, since we are also considering first seen date from
VirusTotal, it seems unlikely that the addition of other feeds that would dramatically reduce
the first seen date for the malware samples in our dataset.
5.5.2.2 Domain Lifetime
Finally, we look at the lifetime of the malware domains using Figure 27, which shows a joint
density distribution between the number of days a domain was resolved and the lifetime of
that domain in days for PUPs, malware, and unclassified samples. We define the “lifetime”
as the difference between the first and last seen dates for each of these domains in passive
DNS.
The joint distribution makes it easy to infer not only how often a domain resolves
but also for how long. In Figures 27b and 27c, we notice that there are three hotspots
that correspond to the most prevalent resolution behaviors for domains in malware and
unclassified malicious software. In the bottom left, we see that there are a large number of
domains that are short lived and rarely resolved. A second hotspot, in the top right corner
of both figures, corresponds to domains with the exact opposite behavior—long lived and
frequently resolved. These domains were regularly queried for the entire duration of our
experiments. Finally, in the bottom right of both figures, we observe a third pocket of
domains that have a long lifetime but infrequent resolution. In this case, we observed only a
105
few queries that were often years apart.
If we focus our attention on Figure 27a, which shows the lifetime patterns for PUP
domains, we observe a completely different distribution. This is the consequence of two
phenomena. First, we have seen the prevalence of PUP domains rise over the last two or
three years, and this fact justifies the bounding of the joint distributions in the [1, 000, 1, 000]
region. The second reason has to do with the seemingly intense and continuing resolution of
PUP related domains—which manifests as a higher density along the diagonal. We believe
that this is a result of organizations failing to block PUP domains and end-point security
engines that do not manage to remediate PUP infections. As Figure 27a shows, this gives
PUPs a significantly different DNS resolution profile. On the other hand, the unclassified
domains shown in Figure 27c follow a very similar pattern to the malware domains shown
in Figure 27b. This likely indicates that most unclassified domains are very likely malware
domains.
Summarizing, Figure 27 makes it clear that the all three types of domains frequently
have long domain lifetimes, and many of those domains are frequently looked up. Since we
showed that most domains were only resolved by a single sample in Section 5.5.1.1, this
suggests that many samples remain active on the Internet for extended periods of time.
5.6 Infrastructure Analysis
In this section, we analyze the hosting infrastructure for the domains resolved by the
malware samples in our dataset. In particular, we want to investigate whether certain IP
ranges appear more often the others, what are the reasons behind this choice, and how the
global infrastructure picture evolved over time.
Figure 28 shows a histogram of the number of samples with domains (after filtering)
resolving into a given /24 subnet, for each year between 2012 and 2015. In each plot, we
observe spikes indicating that certain subnets are resolved by a very large number of samples
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Figure 28: Histograms of number of samples resolving domains that point to /24 subnets.
Spikes are annotated with the owner of the IP range, the family that contacted it, and a letter
indicating whether IPs are associated with malware(M), PUP(P), or a sinkhole (S).
few million samples in 2012 and 2015. Some of the spikes can be observed on multiple
years e.g., 66.150.14.0/24 (Akamai) in 2012–2013 and 148.81.111.0/24 (NASK
Polish CERT) in 2014–2015, while the majority appears in a single year.
We can assign spikes to specific families by analyzing the e2LDs that resolved to those
ranges and use the mapping of e2LD to family produced by our classification in Section 5.4.
This analysis reveals that there are three different reasons behind these spikes.
The largest group corresponds to spikes caused by specific malware families reusing the
same subnet (sometimes even the exact same IP address) for long periods of time. Those
families correspond to some of the Top-10 families by number of samples in Table 18.
The majority of these spikes are due to PUP families (hotbar, domaiq, firseria,
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multiplug) although we also observe some spikes due to polymorphic malware like
vobfus. For example, three of the top four spikes in 2015 correspond to Amazon EC2
ranges and are all due to e2LDs belonging to the multiplug PUP family, which seems
to have migrated its hosting infrastructure to EC2 in 2015. Similarly, the top spike in both
2012 and 2013 is caused by the Hotbar PUP family. This family used the Akamai CDN
in 2012–2014 to host its infrastructure and therefore caused multiple spikes in different
Akamai IP ranges. While we have observed a large number of benign domains resolving to
the Akamai ranges, after our filtering in Section 5.3 it was simple to manually recognize the
Akamai spikes in 2012–2014 and associate them to the Hotbar family.
The second group of spikes corresponds to sinkholes used to redirect resolutions of mali-
cious domains after intervention. The most visible spike in this category is 148.81.111.0/24
in 2014–2015, which is due to sinkhole.cert.pl, used by NASK since 2014 to sink
resolutions of the Polish domains used by the Virut botnet. Our dataset contains 123 Virut
e2LDs resolving to this sinkhole being contacted by over 1M Virut samples in 2015. An-
other example of sinkhole-related spike is 0.0.0.0/24 in 2014, which is caused by a
Microsoft-lead intervention on domains used by the no-ip dynamic DNS provider [13].
The third group of spikes is due to multiple, rather than a single, malware family.
These indicate hotbeds of abuse and appear to keep changing over time. They may cor-
respond to hosting providers that, over a certain time frame, had a more open policy on
acceptable behavior. One such spike is on the right of the 2015 plot and corresponds to
Clara.Net (195.22.26.0/24), a Portuguese hosting provider that hosted many do-
mains associated to the sality, wapomi, ramnit, and techsnab malware families.
Another example is the on the right side of the 2014 plot and corresponds to ChinaNet
(218.92.221.0/24), where we observe domains, among others, of the frethog and
karnos malware families.
Regarding hosting providers, the top spikes in 2012 and 2013 correspond to Akamai (due
to hotbar) and ChinaNet (vobfus). There is also one spike in 2013 due to loadmoney
108
















Figure 29: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the number of NXDomains seen in
malware samples in our datasets.
in the WebZilla cloud hosting service. As an interesting observation, starting from 2014
most spikes occur on IP ranges belonging to cloud hosting providers—most notably EC2,
LeaseWeb, OVH, Serverius, and SoftLayer. One exception is a 2015 spike due to the
vtflooder malware that resolved to 91.223.216.0/24, which is registered to a
private Ukranian person that uses a Gmail abuse email address.
Our analysis shows that the large spikes are dominated by PUP families and can last
for multiple years indicating that PUP utilize seemingly stable IP infrastructure. This may
indicate that popular cloud hosting providers like Amazon EC2, LeaseWeb, or OVH, and
CDNs like Akamai, where PUP spikes happen, may not have the same policies towards
banning PUP that they use for malware.
5.7 DGA Malware
In the previous section, we provided an extensive analysis of the evolution of malware
network infrastructure based on successful DNS resolutions. We now focus on a different
aspect of malware behavior: the presence and impact on our dataset of domain name
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generation algorithms (DGAs).
Since the vast majority of DGA-related queries do not resolve to a valid IP address, to
perform this analysis we first need to reintroduce in our dataset the failed (NXDomain)
resolutions we filtered out in Section 5.3. Since 2011, over 12.5 million malware samples
in our dataset produced at least one NXDomain during their execution. The cumulative
distribution function (CDF) in Figure 29 shows how half of the malware executions have
less than two NXDomain resolutions and only 950,644 have over five.
To identify DGA-generated domains, we check if the domains in our malware executions
dataset appear in the DGArchive [31], which comprises 50M domains generated by the
DGAs of 66 malware families. Table 20 summarizes the overlapping of the DGArchive
domains with both failed and successfully resolved domains in our malware executions
dataset. For each family, it first shows how many e2LDs in the DGArchive are observed
among the 6.8 M domains in our dataset before any filtering (i.e., including NXDomain
queries). Then, it shows how many e2LDs from the DGArchive are observed among the
327 K domains remaining after all filtering.
According to the DGArchive, at least 44% (3 M) of all the e2LDs observed in our
malware executions, regardless whether they successfully resolved or not, were generated
by DGAs. This percentage is a lower bound since the DGArchive likely misses some DGA
families, and also some variants that modify the DGA algorithm or its seed. After filtering,
at least 17% of remaining e2LDs come from DGAs.
Our malware executions contain DGA e2LDs for 42 out of 66 (64%) families in
the DGArchive. This number highlights the large coverage of our dataset. Of those 42
DGArchive families, 4 are variants of another family (e.g., pykspa and pykspa2), which we
group into the 38 families in Table 20. The large majority of DGA domains (82%) come
from virut, followed by pykspa (6%) and necurs (4%). After filtering, successfully
resolved virut DGA domains correspond to 12% of all unfiltered domains, followed by
zbot-gameover (4%), and ramnit (0.5%). While virut is the most common DGA
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family in our dataset (and is still very active despite the 2014 takedown), if we normalize by
number of samples in the family, we observe that virut resolves 1.8 e2LDs per sample,
well below the most aggressive families: emotet (82 e2LDs/sample), murofet (68), and
cryptolocker (53).
The table shows that only 1.8% of DGA domains successfully resolved. It also empha-
sizes different DGA behaviors by the malware families. For example, while we observe over
110K domain names queried by necurs, only one of them was active during our analysis.
This indicates lack of pressure by defenders so the family can keep using the same domain.
On the contrary, in other families like gameover roughly 30% of the queried domains
resolved to a registered IP address.
The 24 families in the DGArchive that we do not observe are likely due to two reasons.
First, some malware use the DGA as a backup option in the malware’s communication
strategy, i.e., only used if the primary C&C domains fail. This may not happen during
the few minutes the samples are executed in the sandbox. Second, for some malware like
TDSS/TDL4, the DGA is only used in specific components, i.e., monetization through ad
abuse. Thus, we may not see DGA domains in our traces because the malware samples have
not run long enough to be monetized.
Finally, in our dataset we also observe five candidate DGA families, not included in the
DGArchive, which perform large numbers of NXDomain queries and have random-looking
domains (fosniw, shiz, softpulse, upatre, wapomi).
5.8 Spam Related Malware
A common way to monetize malware is as distributed mechanism for sending spam. As
discussed in Section 5.3, we excluded spam related malware from our analysis because it is
outside the scope of this work, and we did not wish to influence our analysis with network
activity that is characteristic of typical spam behavior. Since there is already plenty of work
that studies spam in great detail, we provide the following discussion only to provide more
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insight into the spam related samples we excluded from our analysis.
Prior to filtering, we identified a number of malware samples in our dataset that appeared
to be involved in spam behavior. After gathering a set of domains used as MX records or
that were likely to be associated with mail related activity, we built a collection of 405,742
malware samples that contacted these domains. This collection represents malware samples
that were potentially involved in spamming activity. As seen in Figure 30, we noticed that
these samples could be seen contacting hundreds to thousands of unique domains. This
observation can also be seen in Table 21 that shows the ratio of MX lookups per malware
sample. With the exception of Sality, the top 25 malware families queried at least 40 MX
records. Since most malware we studied contacted less than 10 domains, this is an interesting
























Figure 30: Shows a histogram of the number of MD5s associated with each spam related
domain in our filtering set.
Figure 30 shows the number MX lookups and mail related DNS queries for each
potentially spam related malware sample. Notice that there is an interesting peak around 100
domains. After associating 5,239 samples with this spike, we were able to obtain VirusTotal
reports for 909 (17.4%) of these samples; 892 (98.1%) were instances of Mydoom [239]
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malware—a compute worm first sighted in January 2004 and used by e-mail spammers to
send mail from infected hosts. As noted in Section 5.2, our earliest malware feeds start
in January 2011, which is a full seven years after the first sighting of the Mydoom e-mail
worm, and despite being known for over a decade, we still saw active Mydoom variants in
our malware dataset as recently as August 2015. The long lifetime of this particular malware
family is interesting because it suggests that even older malware is effective for spam related
activity.
5.9 Summary
After carefully filtering 26.8 million network traces obtained from dynamic malware ex-
ecution, we are able to make several observations about the characteristics and temporal
network properties of malware domains. First, we show that dynamic analysis traces should
be carefully curated because they often contain a great deal of noise. To help with this
challenge, we detail a rigorous methodology that analysts can use to remove potential noise
from such traces. Next, potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) are not only on the rise, but
surprisingly, they utilize seemingly stable IP infrastructure. In fact, we show that several
hundred thousands PUP samples use the same network infrastructure over an entire year.
Finally, our analysis shows that malware appears to add marginal detection benefits when
trying to build early warning systems based on its network communication. We discovered
that 302,953 malware domains were active at least two weeks—in some cases many months—
before the corresponding malware samples were dynamically analyzed. This means that
malware domain blacklists have limited detection value as malware tends to rapidly churn
through domain names—yielding a very high rate of domain-level polymorphism.
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Table 20: DGA e2LD in the DGArchive [31] resolved in the malware executions in our
dataset.
# Family Before Filtering After Filtering
1 virut 2,477,628 40,452
2 pykspa 189,644 180
3 necurs 110,092 1
4 suppobox 72,476 4,677
5 tinba 52,463 682
6 gameover 24,325 7,083
7 emotet 23,500 96
8 pushdo 13,170 17
9 ranbyus 12,922 7
10 nymaim 12,490 148
11 simda 12,348 590
12 murofet 9,295 20
13 qakbot 4,130 119
14 ramnit 3,560 418
15 cryptolocker 2,912 89
16 conficker 1,710 465
17 sisron 1,394 1
18 oderoor 622 3
19 matsnu 525 130
20 dircrypt 510 53
21 tempedreve 204 20
22 banjori 200 1
23 feodo 192 13
24 urlzone 77 18
25 tsifiri 59 58
26 torpig 53 2
27 ramdo 49 27
28 gspy 49 0
29 bamital 48 2
30 bedep 44 5
31 hesperbot 37 2
32 fobber 31 2
33 gozi 24 8
34 bobax 23 0
35 proslikefan 12 1
36 darkshell 10 3
37 redyms 2 2
38 xxhex 1 1
All 3,026,831 55,396
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Table 21: Top 25 spam families (filtered) ranked by number of MX lookups.
Rank Family Samples MX Ratio
1 mydoom 82.0 K 6.0 M 72.8
2 hlux 1.7 K 3.5 M 2047.2
3 zbot 1.2 K 1.1 M 928.2
4 fareit 953 403.3 K 423.2
5 kelihos 446 388.0 K 870.1
6 winlock 171 373.3 K 2183.0
7 upatre 58 100.6 K 1734.0
8 zusy 54 92.0 K 1702.5
9 sality 23.6 K 86.2 K 3.7
10 tofsee 523 81.6 K 156.1
11 slym 38 63.7 K 1662.2
12 agentb 58 60.6 K 1045.2
13 tedroo 1.3 K 57.0 K 44.6
14 glupteba 21 45.1 K 2149.0
15 mikey 35 44.7 K 1276.2
16 bredolab 88 42.4 K 481.7
17 vblv 18 38.1 K 2115.8
18 yakes 85 35.9 K 422.4
19 tinba 13 34.8 K 2677.8
20 waledac 44 32.2 K 732.9
21 pwszbot 15 29.9 K 1992.4
22 ceeinject 19 26.0 K 1367.5
23 dorifel 195 24.8 K 127.5
24 zboter 10 23.5 K 2355.2
25 staser 2 21.6 K 10786.0




Each of the studies presented in this thesis examines a particular threat over some fixed
snapshot in time. However, beyond simply analyzing security issues of the day, each study
also raises interesting research questions that extend beyond the temporal window of the
original work. This section will explore some of these open research questions and discuss
how they provide interesting research directions for future work. It will also attempt provide
new hypotheses, based on extended reflection, for interesting phenomena discovered in
those studies.
6.1 Mobile Malware
In Chapter 3, we presented an empirical analysis of mobile malware using DNS traffic from
a major cellular provider in the United States. Counter to the prevailing wisdom of the
day, this work found very little network activity to known mobile malware indicators of
compromise— suggesting low infection rates for mobile devices on the cellular network. In
this section, we discuss some interesting research directions based on those findings and
evaluate how those initial results have held up over time.
6.1.1 Tainted Infrastructure
Despite limited evidence of mobile malware communication from mobile devices, this
study observed a large volume of requests to tainted network infrastructure. This tainted
infrastructure was often associated with other known forms of abuse such as phishing,
drive-by-downloads, or traditional malware that did not necessarily target mobile devices.
This raises an interesting question of why mobile devices frequently reach out to this
infrastructure.
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One hypothesis is that users are frequently using their mobile devices for activities
previously done on a traditional computing device. For example, users frequently use mobile
devices to view and respond to e-mails as well as perform basic web browsing—tasks
previously done on traditional computing devices. Consequently, users may frequently
click on unsafe links in e-mails or navigate to unsafe websites on mobile devices instead
of a laptop or desktop. The result is mobile devices are visiting infrastructure historically
associated with abuse.
While some abuse targeting traditional computing devices may not affect mobile devices,
some traditional types of abuse may be more effective against mobile platforms. For example,
existing research has shown that constraints imposed by mobile devices may make mobile
users more susceptible to phishing attacks [42,94]. Beyond being more susceptible to certain
types of attacks, mobile users are not immune to existing threats. In 2011, a vulnerability
in the iOS PDF viewer allowed iOS devices to be rooted from the web browser [207], and
while this was marketed as an easy way for users to jailbreak their devices, it demonstrates
that mobile users should still be cautious about the links and websites they visit.
As mobile device usage continues to rise, Internet adversaries may begin to deploy tar-
geted exploits for the device types visiting tainted infrastructure. Thus, tainted infrastructure
previously innocuous to mobile devices may represent a real security threat. As a result,
an interesting line of research would be to further study what types of exploits exist at the
tainted infrastructure visited by mobile devices—ascertaining whether we see a rise in the
number of targeted exploits against mobile devices.
6.1.2 Mobile Application Markets
At the time of our study, the number of mobile devices was increasing along with the number
of malware samples targeting mobile platforms. However, we still found very little evidence
of mobile devices actively infected with malware. One potential explanation for these low
infection rates is the use of different security paradigms on mobile devices. For example, the
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major mobile device platforms such as the iOS, Android, Windows Phone, and Blackberry
each offered their own first party application markets—centralized repositories of vetted
applications [103,133,240,243]. While software repositories have existed on other platforms
in the form of package management systems [242], these first party application markets
made managed application distribution available and accessible to a much larger group of
end users.
These application marketplaces have grown over the years and offer users a seemingly
endless supply of mobile applications [119,131]. The sheer number of applications available
in these application markets can make it difficult for users to discover new applications—
including malicious applications. Even mobile malware researchers have struggled with
finding malicious applications in these markets, and consequently, previous work has
built automated tools to efficiently scan mobile application markets for likely abusive
applications [69, 254]. Given the challenges encountered by researchers actively looking
for malicious applications in mobile markets, discoverability in large mobile application
markets may play a factor in the low malware infection rates seen in the aforementioned
study.
To aid in discoverability, many mobile marketplaces offer the ability to link directly to
the applications they host [104, 132]. These links can be shared anywhere a normal uniform
resource indicator (URI) can be shared—including websites, social media, or even e-mail.
Such links make it easy for an application developer to direct users to their marketplace
listing without requiring the user to search through the marketplace. However, these links
can also be used by malware authors to direct users to abusive applications. Phishing e-mails
could be sent to end users with market links for re-packaged versions of legitimate apps that
steal user credentials, exfiltrate user data, or worse. Spam or advertisements could also be
used to scare users into downloading fake versions of security tools—replicating a scam
seen in abuse against traditional computing devices.
118
Given the challenges around discoverability in mobile marketplaces, it would be interest-
ing to see how mobile market links are used and potentially abused by abusive applications.
A study that surveys where mobile market links are most frequently observed, how often
they are used for abuse, and what features of such links potentially indicate abuse could
help facilitate a better understanding of the mobile malware ecosystem and improve overall
security even further.
6.1.3 Infection Rate Changes
The original study presented in Chapter 3 presented a snapshot of abuse in 2012. A
natural question is whether the initial results reported in this study have changed over
time. Fortunately, several industry groups have performed independent studies since the
publication of our original study.
In 2015, Verizon performed a study that measured the number of mobile devices infected
with mobile malware on their network, and the results of this study were published in their
Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) [16]. Ultimately, the report observed infection
rates very similar to the results in our study—finding that only about 0.03% of smartphones,
out of tens of millions of mobile devices, per week were infected with malware applications.
Google also publishes a yearly Android Security report that includes measurements of
of global infection rates of potentially harmful applications (PHA)—which Google defines
as apps that could potentially put users, user data, or devices at risk. The latest report [38]
indicated that at most 0.12% of applications installed from the Google Play marketplace
were considered potentially harmful throughout 2017. The percentage rose to 0.92% when
looking at applications not installed through Google Play—suggesting that the majority of
abusive applications are sourced outside the first party marketplace. These numbers are
especially interesting given Google’s global device visibility and access to system level
installation information.
Ultimately, despite the increase in malware samples [161] available for mobile devices,
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the actual number of infected devices still remains at less than 1% for the largest mobile
platform in 2017. While much has changed in the mobile ecosystem over the years, mobile
malware infection rates still represent a real but very small threat—especially for users
installing applications exclusively through first party markets like the Play Store.
6.2 Residual Trust
In Chapter 4, we presented an empirical study of residual trust abuse and demonstrated that
it has become increasingly common in recent years. While our study focused on domain
expirations, these are not the only source of domain ownership changes. In this section, we
will discuss some interesting extensions of this work as well as some future challenges in
this area.
6.2.1 Beyond Expirations
One way that domains frequently change ownership is through domain expirations. However,
this is not the only source of domain ownership changes. Sometimes domains are bought
and sold just like investments. In fact, there is an entire industry around domain name
speculation [241], where certain domains are bought with the belief that their worth will
only grow over time.
Sometimes this speculation is done at the expense of existing brands and trademarks
and is referred to as cybersquatting. The squatter may then try and sell the domain to an
organization that owns the brand or trademark [163], but more frequently cybersquatted
domains are associated with various types of domain abuse such as typosquatting [39],
bitsquatting [78], or combosquatting [139]. Domains used in this manner may sometimes be
reclaimed by a trademark or brand owner through the Uniform Domain Displute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) [128] set forth by ICANN, and many domain speculators avoid cybersquatted
domains for this reason.
Instead, many domain speculators will focus on domains with characteristics like shorter
length, common words, and older top level domains that have a perceived higher value [121].
120
These domains are frequently registered with the sole intent to resell or license their use to an
interested entity. Once a domain has been registered, there are numerous secondary markets
that facilitate the selling or trading of domains between two parties. Similar to second hand
markets like eBay, these sites typically allow sellers to make domains available via a fixed
price sale, best offer, or auction. Ultimately, the seller will transfer domain ownership to the
purchaser of the domain resulting in a change of ownership without the domain expiring. In
some cases, this may even be facilitated by a third party escrow service [86].
This second hand ecosystem of domain ownership changes represents an interesting area
for future research. Domains obtained via these services likely transfer a significant amount
of positive residual trust to new owners, and therefore, they may be of particular interest to
Internet adversaries.
6.2.2 General Data Protection Regulation
In April of 2016, the European Union (EU) adopted a new data protection and privacy
regulation named The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [100]. This legislation
seeks to control the export of personal data outside of the EU and give citizens control over
how that data is used. Enforcement of new GDPR regulations will go into effect on May
25, 2018. While there are many exacting legal requirements, compliance generally requires
companies to carefully handle user data and provide EU citizens with ways to monitor,
control, and delete their data if desired. For technology companies, this means that user data
collected about EU citizens, online or otherwise, will be subject to GDPR regulations.
One source of data that will be affected by new GDPR regulations is domain name
WHOIS information collected by Internet registrars. As discussed in our study on residual
trust, WHOIS data can be used to identify changes in domain ownership, but it can often
be difficult to collect at scale. New GDPR regulations will affect the information collected
by many Internet registrars and may further compound the challenges of working with
WHOIS data. As a result, ICANN currently has several initiatives [127] working to address
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the challenges GDPR will impose on existing registrars and their ability to fulfill existing
contractual obligations. It is unclear what the future holds for WHOIS data [177], and
ultimately, GDPR regulations could result in the WHOIS database being dissolved, requiring
gated access, or disallowing bulk access to records.
The GDPR and uncertainty around the future of WHOIS reflect the public’s growing
frustration with how sensitive personal data is handled. As a result, security researchers may
find it more difficult to obtain this information and might need to rely on other techniques for
identifying down ownership changes. This further highlights the value offered by algorithms
like Alembic, as discussed in Section 4.4.2.2.
6.3 Traditional Malware
In Chapter 5, we presented a longitudinal study of malware over a period of five years—
allowing us to identify trends in malware behavior over time. In addition to confirming
the results of some smaller scale studies, we discovered several new findings that raised
interesting new questions. In this section, we dig a little deeper into some of those findings
and suggest some potential directions for future research.
6.3.1 PUP Behavior
One interesting phenomenon that we identified in our study was the rise of Potentially
Unwanted Programs (PUP)—confirming the results of previous work done on a smaller
scale [141]. In particular, we saw that the number of distinct PUP samples has grown at a
faster rate than malware samples in recent years. This is interesting because we show that
PUP samples appear to exhibit network properties that are distinctly different from that of
malware, as clearly seen in Figure 27.
In particular, we observed that PUPs frequently relied on the same network infrastructure
over extended periods of time. However, despite their reliance on extremely stable infras-
tructure, PUPs did not appear to be remediated more quickly than traditional malware. One
potential hypothesis for this behavior is that PUPs rely on infrastructure that may be more
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difficult to block because it is associated with otherwise benign uses, and Figure 28 shows
that a number of PUPs rely on infrastructure hosted on popular CDNs or cloud providers—a
fact which would be consistent with this hypothesis. Remediating access to PUP infras-
tructure would require an organization to block infrastructure not exclusively associated
with abuse, but the false positives incurred would likely prohibit most organizations from
adopting such a policy.
We also observed that communication with the same infrastructure happened on a very
consistent, periodic basis. Thus, not only did PUPs reuse the same infrastructure over long
periods of time, but they frequently and consistently communicated with that infrastructure.
This behavior is very likely associated with the types of abuse commonly associated with
PUPs. For example, two common types of PUPs are adware and spyware, and both rely on
some combination of surreptitiously gathering user information, monitoring user behavior, or
displaying advertising. Each of these activities would likely require frequent communication
with some common infrastructure—resulting in the usage patterns we observed.
Given the rapid growth in PUPs seen in our study, effectively addressing security
concerns that stem from such software seems like a valuable future research direction. As
discussed earlier, blocking PUPs at the network level poses challenges due to their use
of benign, shared infrastructure. Thus, it might make sense to provide safeguards at the
system level, but this too has challenges. Many PUPs are bundled alongside other legitimate
applications, and this could be one of the reasons we observed a greater degree of binary
polymorphism for such applications in our study—as discussed in Section 5.4. Furthermore,
PUPs may have varying levels of integration with the software they’re bundled with, and it
may not always be the case that bundled PUPs can be safely removed without breaking the
application they were installed with. The combination of binary polymorphism, bundled
installers, and deep integration with bundled applications further add to the challenge of
mitigating the spread of PUPs.
Clearly, PUPs pose difficult challenges for remediation, and their rise indicates that
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current safeguards are not sufficient. A clear future research direction is the development
of better methods, from both the network and system perspective, for dealing with this
emerging threat.
6.3.2 Malware Sectors
Malware poses risks to all sorts of organizations. However, not all organizations share
the same threat model nor are the potential repercussions of a malware infection the same
between different organizations. One component that may affect the potential impact of a
malware infection is the sector an organization belongs to. For example, a malware infection
in a government network may have more dire consequences than a similar infection in a
different sector. Furthermore, the types of malware targeting such networks may exhibit very
different behaviors than more generic malware. Given the different network characteristics
observed in our study, an interesting line of future research would be to examine how those
differences vary across sectors.
One such behavior, the lifetime of a malware sample, would be interesting to measure
across sector boundaries. We observed malware samples with very different lifetimes and
lookup patterns in our study—some very long lived with very regular resolutions. Studying
the lifetime of samples that affect a particular sector could provide insights into the types
of malware families that are likely to target that sector. For instance, sensitive government
or corporate networks might frequently be targets of advanced persistent threats, with the
goal of exfiltrating sensitive data. Such malware might have a longer lifetime with fewer
resolutions to avoid detection by security systems deployed on the network.
Our study also observed that many samples appeared to be active on the network for
weeks or months before they were discovered and reported by the security community.
Studying the sectors these particular samples target might provide insights into why they
take so long to be discovered by the security community. For example, one hypothesis might
be that such malware is discovered in more sensitive sectors first. These sectors may be
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more reticent to release those samples back to the community as doing so would inform the
adversary it had been discovered. Alternatively, the samples could be active in networks
of sectors with less capable security teams, and thus, the samples simply go undetected for
longer periods of time. Ultimately, understanding why these samples take so long to be
discovered could help researchers build better defenses.
Studying how malware affects different sectors could be extremely valuable to the
security community, but performing such a study is not without its challenges. To perform
such a study with DNS, at a minimum, would require access to passive DNS data below the
recursive. This would provide the client information necessary to associate lookups with a
particular network, which could then be linked to a specific sector. Even better might be
access to the authority for a major top level domain—as this would provide visibility into
all resolutions for a particular domain. In this instance, the client information would be the
recursive making the request on behalf of the DNS stub resolver. Many large organizations
run their own recursives, and therefore, this may be enough information to identify the
network associated with a specific sector. If an organization uses a third party recursive,
it may still be possible to identify the network of the stub resolver using the EDNS client
subnet (ECS) extension [72].
Performing a per sector analysis of malware network communication is a natural ex-
tension to the study presented in this thesis and could help answer new questions raised by
some of our findings. Additionally, such a study serves as an excellent example of the type




Ultimately, the goal of each of study in this thesis has been to shed light onto different
threats facing the Internet through empirical analysis. By performing large scale, longitudinal
studies of these Internet threats; we provide insights that can aid in the creation of better
defenses and guide future research directions. To achieve these insights, we performed three
different large scale, longitudinal studies of Internet threats.
The first study presented addressed the emerging threat from mobile malware by em-
pirically measuring malware communication in traffic from a large cellular ISP in the US.
With the rise of smartphones and tablets, malware targeting these platforms has grown
over time. However, prior to our study, it was not well understood how widely the mobile
ecosystem was actually infected with mobile malware. Thus, a key finding of this study was
that infection rates in the mobile ecosystem were much lower than previously believed and
discovering that the network infrastructure was actually the same as that used by traditional
malware.
The next study empirically analyzed the growing threat caused by expiring domain
names. Domain names are often used as anchors of trust, where simple ownership of a
domain is enough to attest one’s identity. Unfortunately, domain ownership can change
and, when this happens, the trust in that domain is implicitly inherited by the future owner—
creating an opportunity for the new owner to abuse that trust. Existing security protections,
such as DNS based blacklists and reputation systems, are impacted by this phenomenon as
malicious actors can leverage the good reputation of an expired domain when they re-register
the domain and repurpose it for abuse. Thus, a key result from this study was empirically
measuring the growth of residual trust abuse by malware—showing consistent year over
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year growth by malware.
Our final study presented a longitudinal analysis of nearly thirty million malware samples
over a half decade. Given the wealth of malware collected over this period, a major goal
of this study was to shed light on how the infrastructure and methods used by Internet
miscreants have evolved over time. This enables us to confirm existing results, unearth new
behaviors, and identify trends that may require further investigation. A key result from
this study was the discovery that malware communication is frequently observed on the
Internet weeks or months before corresponding malware samples are discovered—indicating
defenses that rely on malware samples are unsuitable for early warning systems and may
leave organizations vulnerable to new threats for extended periods of time.
In summary, this thesis provides three different empirical studies that provide valuable
insights into different Internet threats. Chapter 3 presents a study of mobile malware that
discusses the extent to which the mobile ecosystem is actually infected with malware—
presenting a result which challenged the conventional wisdom at the time. In Chapter 4, our
study of domain expirations demonstrated that the residual trust in domains is increasingly
being abused by malware and is also the root cause for many seemingly disparate security
problems. Finally, in Chapter 5, we presented our empirical study of 27M malware sam-
ples over a half decade, which demonstrated that malware samples are discovered weeks
to months after we observe malware related network communication associated with a
particular sample.
7.1 Considerations and Limitations
As we are measuring Internet threats, it is impossible to have perfect visibility into every
aspect of a threat, and sometimes there are limitations to the data available for analysis.
While these limitations do not invalidate the results of the study, it is important that they
are known. In this section, we will discuss limitations encountered for each of the studies
presented in this thesis.
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7.1.1 Limitations of Mobile Malware Study
The goal of this study was to measure the extent to which the mobile ecosystem is actually
infected with malware. This required access to a comprehensive set of mobile malware data
and some means of estimating infected device populations.
7.1.1.1 Malware Datasets
The efficacy of any study on malware is limited to the quantity of known malware that the
study can analyze. As seen in Table 3, we obtained mobile malware from the three most
popular repositories at the time. While the total number of samples may seem small, these
sources represented a comprehensive collection of known malware samples at the time of
our study.
7.1.1.2 Estimating Infected Populations
One means of estimating device populations would be to collect information from security
scanners on mobile devices. For the purposes of our study, obtaining such data from millions
of real world devices would have been impossible. Not only would this have required
users to install some sort of application on their mobile device, but that application would
need sufficient privileges to scan the mobile device for infection. In essence, we would
need access to data from a mobile antivirus vendor that was widely deployed across a large
number of mobile devices. Unfortunately, mobile antivirus was still in its infancy and some
studies suggested that it varied wildly in its detection efficacy [252]. Access to such scans
would be potentially biased since users most apt to install antivirus applications may be
more security conscious, and the results would also be biased on the detection efficacy of
the particular AV vendor.
Instead, we relied on network indicators of compromise to identify mobile devices
reaching out to infrastructure associated with mobile malware. As discussed in Section 3.3.3,
we built a mobile blacklist sourced from three different sources: a security vendor, public
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mobile malware reports, and domains extracted from malware samples. It is unlikely that
this list contained all IOCs for every mobile malware sample, but given the diversity of
sources upon which it was built, we are confident that this list was representative of the
known mobile malware threats at the time.
7.1.1.3 Diversity of Network Data
Lastly, we used passive DNS data collected from a major US cellular ISP for our network
analysis. As a result, our study is inherently biased towards an area with strong first party
mobile markets (i.e., Google Play, iOS App Store). Given the timing of this study, the US
market was currently one of largest markets for smartphone adoption, and we are confident
in these results for that market. An interesting direction for future research could be a similar
study in other countries that lack access to strong first party mobile markets.
7.1.2 Limitations of Expired Domain Study
The goal of this study was to understand the threat from expired domains by empirically
measuring their abuse. To perform this study, we needed to the ability to identify domain
expirations, observe when expired domains were queried by malware, and observe when
malware domains were first resolved.
7.1.2.1 WHOIS Data
To identify changes in domain ownership, WHOIS data is a natural choice since it provides
a registry of who owns a particular domain at any point in time. Unfortunately, WHOIS
data has a number of problems. First, the data in WHOIS is not verified, which means
domain owners can put anything they want in their WHOIS records. Second, WHOIS data
is frequently privacy protected, containing only information about the service providing the
privacy service. Third, WHOIS data is difficult to obtain at scale because each registrar
imposes its own policies on automated querying of WHOIS data. Exceeding these restric-
tions will result in the offending IP address being blacklisted for some variable period of
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time. Therefore, in our study, we were only able to make limited use of WHOIS in verifying
results—limiting our ability to build a true classification system for domain ownership
changes.
7.1.3 Limitations of Longitudinal Malware Study
The goal of this study was to shed light on how the infrastructure and methods used by
malware have evolved over time. This study required access to a large set of malware
samples collected over an extended period of time. Consequently, most of the limitations of
this study surround the data necessary to perform this study.
7.1.3.1 Malware Datasets
As detailed in Section 5.2, our study used network signal collected from dynamic malware
analysis of nearly 27M samples over a half decade, and these executions results were
sourced from three different malware feeds. Dynamic analysis of malware has a number of
known limitations. For example, dynamic execution environments run for some predefined
quantum of time before exiting—a behavior which is necessary due to the halting problem.
If this quantum is too short, the execution of the malware may be exited before any sort of
malicious behavior has been triggered. This is an inherent limitation of dynamic malware
analysis. In our study, we are not concerned with measuring the limitations of dynamic
execution environments; instead, we simply want the network signal that is collected from
such analysis. While the details of each feed may differ, to the best of our knowledge they
all are adhering to state of the art practices for dynamic malware analysis.
7.1.3.2 Passive DNS Data
We complement our analysis with passive DNS data from a major ISP in the US. This
data allows us to observe when we first see resolutions to malware domains in a real world
network, as discussed in Section 5.5.2.1. Since we only have access to DNS resolutions,
we cannot inspect the communication payloads being sent to the infrastructure a malware
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domain resolves to. In our analysis, we do try and exclude resolutions that are unlikely to
be associated with malware communication by excluding communication before a domain
expired—which are likely instances of malware abusing positive residual trust abuse as
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. We also analyze domain lifetimes in Section 5.5.2.2 to
understand the resolution behavior of domains that are resolved weeks or months before
their corresponding malware is discovered, and we find that most domains are looked up
frequently over their lifetime—suggesting periodic lookup behavior consistent with malware
activity. Still, we cannot be absolutely certain why a domain is resolved prior to discovering
a malware sample since we cannot analyze the communication that followed a given DNS
resolution.
7.2 Closing Remarks
This thesis studied several emerging and existing threats through empirical analysis with
passive DNS data. These studies resulted in three key insights that were previously unknown
to the security community. First, the study of mobile malware empirically demonstrated
that very few mobile devices appear to be infected with mobile malware—challenging the
conventional wisdom of the time—and that mobile threats look similar from the perspective
of network infrastructure. The second study in this thesis analyzed how residual trust in
domains is abused by malicious actors. This study not only showed that residual trust abuse
is the underlying cause of many seemingly disparate security problems, but it is also a
threat that is increasingly being leveraged by malware—showing consistent growth year
over year. Lastly, our longitudinal study of nearly 27M malware samples over half a decade
demonstrated that malware samples are frequently discovered weeks or months after the
threat is visible on the network—suggesting that systems that rely on malware may result in
large windows of vulnerability for organizations that rely on them. Not only do the studies
in this unearth valuable insights into several existing and emerging Internet threats, but they
underscore how DNS provides a platform agnostic data source for studying Internet threats.
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In summary, the insights on Internet threats presented in this thesis should guide future
research and provide valuable insights that help build better defenses.
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PITROPAKIS, N., NIKIFORAKIS, N., and ANTONAKAKIS, M., “Hiding in Plain
Sight: A Longitudinal Study of Combosquatting Abuse,” in Proceedings of the 2017
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 08
2017.
[140] KOLBITSCH, C., HOLZ, T., KRUEGEL, C., and KIRDA, E., “Inspector Gadget:
Automated Extraction of Proprietary Gadgets from Malware Binaries,” in Proceedings
of the 31st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (OAKLAND), 2010.
[141] KOTZIAS, P., BILGE, L., and CABALLERO, J., “Measuring PUP Prevalence and PUP
Distribution through Pay-Per-Install Services,” in Proceedings of the 25th USENIX
Security Symposium (SECURITY), 2016.
[142] KOTZIAS, P., MATIC, S., RIVERA, R., and CABALLERO, J., “Certified PUP: Abuse
in Authenticode Code Signing,” in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on
Computer and Communication Security (CCS), 2015.
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